Security clearance process still a paperwork exercise

The process to issue federal security clearances has been partially automated, but it still remains "one large paper shuffle," requiring as much as a year and a half to obtain a clearance, according to a top information technology official.

The paper shuffle begins with the Joint Personnel Adjudication System operated by the Defense Security Service, which cannot bundle in digital format the SF-86 security clearance form and required fingerprints and signatures, said Ben Romero, chairman of the Intelligence Committee of the Information Technology Association of America. Romero testified Feb. 13 before the House Readiness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee.

Security clearance applicants must submit fingerprint ink cards, despite the fact that Defense Department has moved to capturing recruits' fingerprints digitally, a process some other federal agencies and most local law enforcement agencies already follow, Romero said.

The clearance process hits another technological speed bump at the Office of Personnel and Management, which took over clearance investigations for DSS in 2005. OPM manages clearance investigations with its Personnel Investigations Processing System, which Romero described as an antiquated mainframe computer system that is incapable of saving electronic attachments.

PIPS "forces continuation of labor-intensive paper handling that significantly delays the processing of clearances," Romero said. For example, PIPS performs case assignment, but once a case is assigned, it is printed out and mailed to investigators for processing. For paperwork management, OPM uses bar codes, which are manually keyed, printed and affixed to documents in the hard copy files, he added.

Several agencies, including the General Services Administration, compound the security clearance paperwork burden by ignoring OPM's mandate to electronically submit requests for clearances using the Electronic Questionnaires for Processing (e-QIP) system, Romero said. Instead the agencies require applicants to complete paper applications and include extraneous information, such as résumés, as part of the application. Romero estimated that 25 percent to 40 percent of all security clearance applications that OPM accepts are hard copy.

As a result, Romero told the subcommittee, that the average processing time for Secret clearances averaged 200 days in 2007, and the average time for processing Top Secret clearances was 300 days last year.

In a report sent to Congress on Feb. 15, OMB said 83 percent of federal agencies were using e-QIP in the first quarter of 2008, with Defense using it for submission of 77 percent of its clearance investigations and non-Defense agencies using it 95 percent of the time.

OPM said in the report that it had cut the end-to-end time for initial clearance investigations in the first quarter of 2008 to 188 days and the time for Top Secret re-investigations to 217 days.

The Government Accountability Office has classified the security clearance process as a high-risk program. Jack Edwards, GAO's acting director of Defense capabilities and management, told the subcommittee that "continuing delays in determining clearance eligibility can result in increased costs and risk to national security." Edwards said delays in renewing clearances for personnel performing classified work can lead to a heightened risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

OPM has a difficult time managing clearances because Defense underestimates the number of clearance investigations it requires annually. The Office of Management and Budget requires this estimate to be within 5 percent of its estimate of the actual number of investigations conducted, but Edwards said that in the first half of 2006 Defense had exceeded its estimate by 59 percent.

Kathy Dillaman, associate director of OPM's Federal Investigative Services division, told the panel that by relying on a suite of automated information tools, OPM could process clearances in an end-to-end paperless system this year.

Romero told the subcommittee that OPM relies on document and fingerprint images, which he does not consider automation, but rather "nothing more than taking a picture of a document and is ineffective at capturing the data in the document for use in an information technology system."

Romero said the only way to break the security clearance logjam was to develop an Internet-based system that collects all information electronically and serves as the basis for an end-to-end digital process "that creates a record that can be amended by investigators, adjudicators and security officers for the life of that clearance."

COMMENTS

  • I was wondering if there are any detail steps or references on how to obtain security clearance.
  • Several experienced contract investigators were unlawfully suspended by Ms Dillaman OPM FISD, her staff to include those in the cave (USIS) who work for OPM FISD, for security concerns that were never proven, did not exist, which included a process to defame their character; disrupting livelihoods; and being judged as a Federal Employees, which they were not. Contracting Companies conducting background to years QUIT (MSM & Omnisec) which caused a loss of over 2 to 3 thousand great contract investigators and knowledgeable staff, because of the inability of those within OPM FISD. Those wrongfully accused as criminals made every effort to obtain proper due process, but OPM Officials failed in every sense of the word to provide fair and impartial justice, and purposely disregarded all responses and correspondence. The offices included: Director of OPM; OPM Inspector General; OPM FIS and the OPM General Counsel. Ms. Dillaman, Director of OPM FIS, purposely delays all processes, and is well known in the business to be deceptive, in order to keep her job, in conjunction with others in her office, which in it self is the route to the delays of backgrounds. The practice of incompetence and the deception by directors is the cause. All those of OPM FISD had deliberately ignored our Constitutional and Federal Laws, Regulations and OPM Notices. Even the OPM General Counsel’s Office ignored all responses. OPM FISD continuous deception and delaying, is an endless road. The lack of fair and impartial justice not given and abuse of power, by those within OPM is the real reason, and it is known. There are people in the business that can correct the backlog in months, but because of the reputation of OPM FISD, no one cares. YOU KNOW IT, and the BS within OPM FISD will get worse, lives will be and most likely have been loss as a result of incompetent people of the OPM FISD Staff. This country had to depend on our soldiers and agents in the field, and when they retired, since the 80’s had contracted with agencies for little money and got the job done, out of patriotism, and loyalty, but now we have those that are greedy, incompetent running our security, - we deserve everything we get, if you don’t wait up NOW.
  • Mr. Richard Morse's comment above hits the nail on the head. The AFCIA has invited OPM to our National Conference 2006 in Virginia. The same story is still being repeated. Pres. Bush has directed a plan be placed on his desk April 30, 2008 from OMB and OPM - the very agencies who has messed up this industry to begin with. The first thing that must be done is to get the "Government Human Resources Office - OPM" back to providing government employee benifits and out of the security/intelligence industry. In reveiwing Congress' "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 2004" the difference between an background investigation and a personal security investigation is defined. OPM is versed in "suitability" investigations and doesn't have a clue how to conduct a personal security investigation (PSI). DOD has mandated that our military operatives (especially in Iraq and Afghanistan) NOT disclose peraonal information because they and their families are targets. OPM-FISD Agents nor the Contract Investigators do NOT have a security clearance (OPM does not have adjudication authority) is placing our operatives in grave danger. Also of note, OPM has been reporting all the hundred of thousands of cases that they have closed... how many can be adjudicated? DSS conducted an SSBI-PR for $1850; OPM charges $3750 where unskilled and uncleared investigators conduct PSIs. If an Investigator discovers issued during the course of the investigation, they only report the "issue." They are not allowed to investigate the issue. OPM submitts the case to the Adjudicator; the Adjudicator is unable to adjudicate the case because there are unresolved issues. The Adjudicator must request OPM to investigate the issue. OPM opens another case (SPIN) and investigates the issue... for another $1850! Yes, OPM is closing cases quicker but not better. OPM has a cash-cow and do you think they are going to Congress asking for a way to do PSIs better? - - - There's no money in that! Let's just continue to suck the life out of our taxpayers' $$$. "You want it bad; You get it bad."