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Defense Department weapons programs are failing to deliver capabilities as promised, even with expanding costs and schedules, the Government Accountability Office reported on Monday.

From 2000 to 2007, Defense roughly doubled its planned investment in new weapons systems from $790 billion to $1.6 trillion. Weapons systems now represent one of the largest discretionary items in the budget. The department expects to invest about $900 billion during the next five years on "development and procurement," 37 percent of which will go specifically to new major weapons systems.

Despite ballooning spending, acquisition outcomes in terms of cost and schedule have not improved, said the watchdog agency in its annual assessment of weapons acquisitions.

GAO reviewed 72 Defense programs, selected from 95 total based on dollar value, acquisition stage and congressional interest. None adequately met best practice standards for mature technologies, stable design or mature production processes by critical junctures of the acquisition, the 205-page report stated. Meeting these standards at key checkpoints is crucial to achieving planned cost, schedule and performance outcomes.

Many of the problems weapons system procurements face are the same as those of other procurement programs across government, including shifting requirements and workforce issues. GAO found that 63 percent of programs reviewed had changed requirements after development began. They encountered cost increases of 72 percent, compared with increases of 11 percent among programs that did not change requirements.

Shifting expectations in software development have particularly pronounced consequences on cost and scheduling. GAO found that half the programs had significant growth in the lines of code used to develop software, showing that managers struggle to accurately predict the amount of code needed.

Changing requirements also caused program delays, which in turn cost the government more money, GAO said. The assessed programs experienced an average delay of 21 months in delivering the first capabilities to warfighters. That was a five-month increase from the average delay in fiscal 2000, forcing the services to spend more to maintain existing systems, the report said.

From a workforce standpoint, weapons acquisitions were hampered by the revolving door for program mangers and heavy reliance on contractors to provide support functions, GAO said. According to the report, the average tenure for weapons programs started since 2001 was 17 months, less than half the length recommended in Defense policy. GAO viewed these short tenures as a threat to accountability and to the continuity of the programs.

Government auditors also questioned whether the Defense workforce had an appropriate mix of capabilities to effectively manage these programs. It was clear that the department has relied heavily on contractors to perform work previously done by federal employees, the report said. Forty-eight percent of the staff on assessed programs were made up of nongovernment employees. GAO said these contractors were taking on engineering, business and program management support roles.

One of the overarching problems with the weapons programs, according to GAO, was a deficit of a "knowledge-based acquisition process." Lack of crucial information at turning points in the project exposes programs to significant, and unnecessary, technology, design and production risks, the report said.

The Defense Department has taken steps to address these roadblocks, Gene Dodaro, acting comptroller general, wrote in a letter to Congress accompanying the report, but these steps, have yet to yield results.

"Policy without practice is not uncommon within the department, and the upcoming change in administration presents challenges in advancing progress through sustained implementation of best practices, as well as addressing new issues that may emerge," Dodaro wrote. Turning things around will require a strong consistent vision, direction and advocacy from leadership and sustained oversight by Congress, he said.

GAO made several recommendations, including balancing and prioritizing the department's portfolio of weapons system acquisitions. The watchdog group said "the right mix of weapons systems would alleviate the pressure each program now faces in winning funding from others." The report also called for strong knowledge-based business cases at the start of each program, to ensure promises on cost, schedule and performance are realistic.

Dodaro said that with weapons spending dramatically increasing and discretionary funds decreasing, now is not the time for waste.

"Every dollar spent inefficiently in developing and procuring weapons systems is less money available for many other internal and external budget priorities -- such as the global war on terror and growing entitlement programs," he wrote.

In response to a request for comment, Defense spokesman Chris Isleib said the department was planning to release a statement.

COMMENTS

• Basic systems engineering and how you build something has not changed in the 30+ years I have been working for the government. Systems are more complex and have more software than ever. We have better tools for managing requirements and measuring performance. It is the acquisition system that is the problem. Program managers are not allowed the tools to do their jobs. They have to plan 8-10 years in advance for technology that has not been developed and estimate what it is going to cost and how long it will take to build when there is no precedent. They get their funds every year and have to fight to keep what what promised to the program 8 years ago. Then you have Congress telling them what to do and which programs are the priority (congressional plus ups). You have OSD taking funds from programs who are doing well to fund the overruns on the political programs like JSF and F-22. Program Managers will never be able to succeed until the whole acquisition system changes. They have never been truly empowered to execute the program. So the warfighter suffers! BW Posted April 30, 2008 5:08 PM
• An easier question when has the government ever let a contract for anything that didn't come in over budget. With the idiots in contracting there is no such thing as coming in on time on budget. All they are concerned about is the high stress level and why they didn't get promoted dan ketter Posted April 2, 2008 10:38 PM
• And this is news because...this has been an on-going situation. The problem basically starts at the White House then on to Congress and high ranking military personnel. The President is looking for allies receiving financial support or granting favors to those who provided financial backing, with members of Congress running a close second. As for the high ranking military personnel, they're looking toward the future after retirement from the military and a place they can call 'home'. People should have paid attention to the movie satire (The Pentagon Wars) on Government spending for a troop transport vehicle, which was not as far-fetched as most were lead to believe. This satire is a 'mirror image' of what actually transpires during the various phases of Lifecycle and Acquisition Logistics, Test and Evaluation and Sustainment Logistics, beginning with the ONS. Unfortunately, in most instances once a weapon system is fielded, it’s already ten years behind the power curve and does not resemble what was initially requested based upon input from various entities. CAE Posted April 2, 2008 1:56 PM