GAO: Army transformation goals may slip
Military regional commanders in chief say they are eager for the Army to field new medium-weight brigades, but a new General Accounting Office study warns that the brigades may not live up to the Army's billing, at least initially. High personnel turnover, delays in equipment development and shortfalls in the Air Force's airlift capacity together jeopardize the Army's goal of deploying the first combat-ready brigade next spring, the study said.
The Army plans to field six of the new tactical units, called Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT), by 2008, although service leaders are looking for a way to accelerate that schedule so that all six brigades are equipped, trained and ready for deployment by 2005.
The new brigades are intended to fulfill a gap in the Army's combat capabilities. While there are some exceptions, Army combat units generally fall into one of two categories: heavy armored forces, which employ overwhelming firepower but can take months to deploy; and light infantry forces, which can deploy rapidly but carry little in the way of sustainable firepower. Ultimately, the Army hopes to field a force as agile as its light-infantry units, but with the firepower of heavy armored units, although the technology to create such a force does not yet exist.
In the meantime, service leaders hope the medium-weight brigades, known as IBCTs, will fill a post-Cold War gap in the Army's capability. During the Persian Gulf war, for example, Army light infantry troops that were rapidly deployed to protect Saudi Arabian oil fields were essentially defenseless against Iraqi armored units had those units invaded Saudi Arabia. For whatever reason, Iraq didn't invade, giving the United States the several months it needed to deploy the armored force that later proved so decisive in battle.
While the new brigades won't be as lethal as existing armored units, they can be deployed much more quickly-in days as opposed to months. Likewise, they won't be quite as quick to deploy as the light infantry, which can deploy in a matter of hours, but they'll pack much more firepower when they get where they're going.
In interviews with GAO auditors, military leaders in all three services embraced the Army's plans for the brigades and cited numerous operational uses for the new units. But the regional commanders in chief, or CINCs, -the senior war planners in charge of military operations around the globe-also were skeptical about whether the brigades would be able to deploy anywhere in the world in 96 hours, one of the Army's key goals.
The CINCs also were concerned the brigades would not have the desired combat capability or be able to sustain themselves on the battlefield as planned, according to GAO's report "Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams" (02-442).
Their concerns are warranted, GAO found. The brigades are to have several types of vehicles based on a common design to minimize maintenance and logistical support in the field. But two of the required variants of the vehicle, including a mobile gun system, won't be ready by the time the first brigade is to be certified by the Army as ready for deployment next spring. While the brigade will use substitute vehicles until the intended vehicles are completed, it will be difficult to fully gauge the effectiveness of the Army's plans without the actual vehicles in place.
Additionally, the Army has encountered a number of training challenges. Because of the relatively steep learning curve faced by unit members-not only are they using equipment new to the Army, but they are also developing unique warfighting doctrine centered around the new units' capabilities-personnel stability is important. Yet the Army's normal rotation policy transfers soldiers every two years or less.
"In short, when the trained personnel rotate out of the IBCT, they take their training with them; but no equally trained personnel are available to rotate in. Consequently, the IBCT requires a constant program of providing basic training to incoming personnel in digital equipment, which is available only at Fort Lewis, [Wash.,] or Fort Hood, [Texas]," the report said.
While the Army did put new policies in place last May to reduce turnover, many personnel had already left the unit by then. Also, there were so many exceptions to the policy its effectiveness was questionable. Unless the Army starts tracking the reasons for soldiers leaving the unit, it will be difficult to address the problem, according to GAO.
GAO also reported that the military will need to upgrade facilities and airfields to accommodate the brigades, an expensive proposition in some cases, and that the Air Force lacks sufficient aircraft to move the brigades to the battlefield under the Army's timetable for deployment.