Transportation security agency's progress uneven

Most aviation experts agree that the nation's airport security is much better than it was before September 11. And a year from now, they say, it will be much better than it is today. But the system is certainly not perfect today-and unfortunately, it never will be.

One of the government's first post-9/11 actions was creating the Transportation Security Administration last November to supervise security for the nation's airways, railways, roadways, and waterways. Because of the difficult airport security deadlines it faces later this year, however, the TSA has spent most of its energy and resources on aviation.

The new agency, originally placed within the Transportation Department, has been on a constant bureaucratic roller-coaster ride. In July, its chief, John W. Magaw, was forced to resign after complaints over lack of progress in meeting deadlines and over his poor communication with Congress and aviation interests. Adm. James M. Loy, the former commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, has replaced Magaw. In addition, it's quite likely that the TSA will move from the Transportation Department into the new Department of Homeland Security.

While experts give the TSA high marks for its attempts to bolster security, they say the agency has come up short in many areas. For example, government tests show that screeners are still allowing too many prohibited items to get past airport security checkpoints. The TSA has also been criticized for moving too slowly in implementing two key provisions of last year's airport security legislation: federalizing the workforce of screeners, and meeting the deadline to screen all passenger bags through explosive-detection machines.

But those shortcomings aren't entirely the TSA's fault. The deadlines and standards that Congress set for the agency were ambitious and unprecedented. As James K. Coyne, president of the National Air Transportation Association, put it, "They're trying to pass a course that no one can pass."

Cockpit Doors

Immediately after the September 11 attacks, the Federal Aviation Administration established a rule mandating that the airlines secure their cockpit doors, through either a deadbolt lock or a steel bar. That, however, was just a stopgap measure. In January, the FAA passed another emergency rule, which required the airlines to install bulletproof-even grenade-proof-cockpit doors by April 2003.

Yet things got off to a slow start. Peggy Gilligan, the FAA's deputy associate administrator for regulation and certification, says initial door designs created pressurization problems in the cabin. But that was eventually solved, and the FAA has approved designs for some of the major Boeing and Airbus models. Gilligan says that installation of these doors has finally begun.

But not everyone is optimistic that the deadline will be met. Michael Wascom, spokesman for the Air Transport Association, which represents the major air carriers, says that the models certified by the FAA account for only about one-third of the fleet of ATA member companies. With the deadline approaching, he said, the delay in certification "has greatly reduced the time available to install these essential upgrades."

Another problem is the cost of the hardened doors, which is estimated to be from $30,000 to $50,000 each. The airlines have complained that the government hasn't given them enough money for the installation. Despite these worries, the FAA's Gilligan says that the deadline will be met. "We are not only optimistic," she said. "We are sure."

Air Marshals

This is the one security effort that has seen the most progress. On September 11, the number of federal air marshals stood at fewer than 50. Today, their ranks have exploded to a reported 2,000; however, the Transportation Department maintains that the actual number is classified. Air marshals receive 12 to 15 weeks of training-in airports, at firing ranges, and inside practice aircraft-and they have the highest shooting qualification standards of all law enforcement agencies.

At a recent congressional hearing, Michael P. Jackson, the Transportation Department's deputy secretary, said that the department had established an ambitious goal in November to expand the air marshal program, and that the target is being met. "We have nailed those goals to the wall," he said.

Despite this apparent progress and the air marshals' impressive shooting skills, one glaring shortcoming remains: There still aren't enough marshals. Indeed, these marshals-who usually work in pairs or in groups of three or more-ride on just a fraction of the nation's 35,000 daily flights. And that's one reason why many in Congress and the aviation community have pushed to allow pilots to carry guns in the cockpit.

Baggage Screening

Just two months after the airport security bill was signed into law, the TSA had to meet its first big deadline: to be screening all passenger bags by January 18, 2002. Despite Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta's doubts about whether the TSA could meet that goal-after all, the airlines had been screening fewer than 5 percent of bags before the law's passage-the job got done through a hodgepodge of methods, such as positive bag-matches, bomb-sniffing dogs, and screening by hand.

But the TSA now faces a tougher deadline: to ensure that all bags are being checked through explosive-detection systems (EDS) or trace-detection machines by December 31. To meet this goal, the TSA will need to deploy 1,100 EDS and 6,000 trace machines. The Transportation Department's inspector general has noted that such an effort has never been attempted: It represents three times the amount of such equipment currently deployed at airports worldwide. As of July 9, only 215 of the EDS machines and 273 of the trace machines were in use.

Airports must be reconfigured to fit the SUV-sized EDS machines, a job that costs time and money. And operating the labor-intensive trace machines will require a checked-baggage workforce of 21,600, which could crowd airport lobbies and cause delays. Consequently, most observers don't believe the TSA will meet the deadline. "They are a year away," said one transportation lobbyist. "I don't think the equipment will be in place" by December 31.

The good news for the TSA is that the House extended this deadline by up to a year in its recently passed Homeland Security Department bill. Whether that extension becomes law, however, is still anyone's guess.

Passenger Screening

Despite the intense scrutiny on airport screening, the system still has plenty of holes. From November to February, the DOT inspector general's office conducted tests at 32 airports and discovered that screeners failed to detect knives, guns, and explosives in 48 percent of the tests. In another round of tests the TSA conducted in June, screeners still failed to find these prohibited items 24 percent of the time.

The administration, however, has been quick to counter that the screening workforce in those tests hadn't yet been federalized; in most cases, the screeners who failed these tests were the same ones who were working before September 11. That is correct. The airport security legislation that was signed into law last fall transferred control of the screening workforce from the airlines to the federal government. Under the law, the TSA must hire and deploy this workforce-which is estimated to be 33,000 screeners and managers-by November 19, 2002.

Unfortunately, the TSA has been moving slowly. As of July 13, it had hired, trained, and deployed only 2,475 screeners, just a fraction of the workforce it envisions. To meet its goal, the TSA will have to hire and train more than 7,600 screeners per month over the next four months. Yet according to Mineta, the plan that DOT created to federalize this workforce was designed to begin slowly, and it was understood that most of the hires would come later in the process. In fact, the TSA says it has already hired 8,000 screeners. "We are on schedule," Mineta recently told Congress.

Crew Training/Worker Security

Before September 11, terrorists had hijacked planes only to get to a foreign country (such as Cuba), or to negotiate for something they desired (such as release of prisoners). But the concept of a hijacking changed when terrorists took control of American airliners and slammed them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Not surprisingly, pilots and flight attendants have begun to rethink their approach to hijackings. Duane E. Woerth, president of the Air Line Pilots Association, says that the pilots, flight attendants, and airlines have worked together to develop a "common strategy" to respond to future suicide hijackings. For security reasons, he won't reveal the specifics, but Woerth explains that the strategy involves enhancing communication among the pilots, flight attendants, and air marshals.

But according to Patricia Friend, president of the Association of Flight Attendants, not enough has been done on the training front, particularly when it comes to flight attendants. While the airport security legislation addressed flight-attendant training, Friend says the language wasn't specific enough to improve things. She argues that in some cases airlines have offered only two or three hours of additional training, and that "under the current system, we are no better prepared to fight off an attacker in the cabin than we were on September 11, and that is unacceptable." The Association of Flight Attendants is currently supporting legislation in Congress that would set detailed requirements for cabin crew training programs.

The TSA has mandated that all airport workers with access to secure areas undergo criminal background checks. Having committed any of some 30-odd crimes will disqualify workers from employment. The TSA has until November to complete these checks, although the agency says that most of them are already completed.

But Friend finds plenty of holes in the system. She explains that because many airports have employee entrances that provide access to the gates and lobbies, anyone who can get inside the employee entrance has access to the entire airport. Because there are no magnetometers at the employee entrances, she said, people can show up with a photo ID, but "no one knows what they are carrying."

On the other hand, some airline employees complain they are subjected to the same random searches and checkpoints that all passengers must go through-even though these employees have undergone background checks and have keys to the cockpits. Such indiscriminate searching is "ridiculous," said Woerth. "We treat every citizen as [a threat equal] to Mohamed Atta." The Air Line Pilots Association and several airlines have been pushing the TSA to introduce some sort of a universal ID card for airline employees that would incorporate a retinal scan or fingerprint. The TSA has said it's considering the proposal.

General Aviation/Small Airports

The TSA has established a classified security program for general aviation operators. James Coyne, president of the National Air Transportation Association, which represents general aviation interests, says his industry has come up with its own security advice for operators in dealing with the airport, the aircraft, and the people in the planes. In addition, since September 11 general aviation operators have a heightened awareness about security.

Still, the government hasn't been paying much attention to general aviation. In testimony before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, the General Accounting Office noted that the TSA has set only a few guidelines for GA security. Coyne doesn't think it should be that big a priority, noting that the teenager who flew his plane into a skyscraper in Tampa, Fla., in January didn't do much damage. "I don't think people feel that GA is a significant threat," he said.

In addition to America's 429 commercial airports, thousands of smaller airports and landing strips are scattered across the country. Because of the small size of these facilities, the federal government hasn't done much to improve their security. But after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, even these small strips do seem to have a new sense of awareness about security.