Agencies' port security efforts called 'insufficient'

Homeland security officials say they have made progress over the past year in their complex, multi-agency effort to implement technologies aimed at preventing terrorists from using massive sea containers to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States. But many lawmakers and watchdogs see a lack of coordination in those efforts and have cautioned that the most effective technologies are not being deployed quickly enough.

"Despite reassurances from the administration, the security of our nation's ports and borders remains insufficient to protect us from nuclear smuggling by terrorists," Pennsylvania Republican Jim Greenwood, chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, said during a hearing earlier this month. "Simply put, more needs to be done."

A System 'Ripe For Exploitation'

An independent, blue-ribbon task force co-chaired by former Sens. Gary Hart, D-Colo., and Warren Rudman, R-N.H., echoed that warning last week, releasing a report that called the global trade system "ripe for exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by terrorists." Noting that 95 percent of all non-North American U.S. trade moves by sea, the 17-member task force said trade security is a "critical mandate" in need of immediate action.

"While 50,000 federal screeners are being hired at the nation's airports to check passengers, only the tiniest percentage of containers, ships, trucks and trains that enter the United States each day are subject to examination, and a weapon of mass destruction could well be hidden among this cargo," said the task force, which was sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.

The panel added that federal grants have covered only a tiny percentage of what it will cost port authorities to prevent such smuggling. The task force cited estimates that adequate physical security would cost the nation's commercial ports about $2 billion. But so far, only $92.3 million in federal grants have been approved.

"Even then, the grants have not been awarded on the basis of a port's relative importance to the nation," the task force said, noting that the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach-through which 43 percent of all U.S.-bound sea containers arrived in 2001-requested $70 million in grants after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks but were awarded only about $6.2 million. "The adequacy of such grant levels needs urgent re-examination."

A Critical Eye Toward Customs

Another urgent priority, according to many lawmakers, is improving technological expertise within the Customs Service, the agency with primary responsibility for combating nuclear smuggling.

"While Customs agents put their lives on the line every day and are experts in the interdiction of guns, drugs and money, they are not experts in the interdiction of nuclear devices or in the assessment, procurement or deployment of systems designed to detect nuclear devices," Greenwood said. "Customs simply does not possess the technical expertise for a coherent strategic plan for prioritizing, selecting and installing radiation-detection equipment at our 301 ports of entry."

But Greenwood noted that other agencies-such as the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Defense Department's Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) -do have that type of expertise. He said Customs must improve its ability to tap that expertise and coordinate its high-tech initiatives with those of other agencies.

"These scientists possess real-world experience in not only the detection of nuclear sources but in the assessment and the installation of the necessary equipment," Greenwood said. "But ... Customs is not utilizing our country's best and brightest to protect us from the threat of nuclear terrorism at our nation's ports and borders."

Florida Democrat Peter Deutsch, who serves as ranking member on Greenwood's subcommittee, said that although Customs has made some progress in recent months, the agency's port security efforts over the past year have been "marked with confusion and delay."

Deutsch raised concerns about Customs' efforts to install radiation-detection equipment at ports and borders since Sept. 11. "I believe that the efforts of your agency, for whatever reason, have lacked a cohesive strategy to accomplish this goal, and this effort needs to be better organized," Deutsch told Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner during the subcommittee hearing. "I believe that your agency has also proceeded too slowly."

In Search Of The Best Strategy

Several lawmakers also complained after a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report showed that the federal government has deployed more sophisticated radiation-detection technology to Russian ports and borders than it uses at U.S. ports.

GAO officials said the Energy Department has installed 70 portal monitors at various locations in Russia, at a cost of $11.2 million. So far, those monitors have led to the interception of 275 cases containing radioactive materials. "I think it's important that we take those same types of steps in the U.S.," Kentucky Republican Rep. Edward Whitfield told the subcommittee.

Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner told the panel that deploying advanced nuclear-detection technology to foreign countries helps U.S. Customs agents stationed overseas to screen cargo containers for potential terrorist weapons before they leave for the United States. "An important part of our strategy to address the nuclear threat is pushing our zone of security outward, pushing our borders outward, so that ... our ports of entry in the United States are the last line of defense, not the first line of defense against this threat," Bonner said.

But Bonner added that NNSA has helped Customs to improve security at U.S. ports by drawing on expertise from the Energy Department and several of the national laboratories. He said that so far, Customs has deployed 96 large-scale X-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems to certain U.S. ports to help screen cargo containers for terrorist weapons. Customs agents at all U.S. ports also wear personal radiation detectors known as "pagers" on their belts.

"So there is some capability to detect nuclear materials at U.S. ports of entry, but to further augment our nuclear detection capabilities ... we are also acquiring and deploying portal radiation detectors," Bonner said. He noted that Customs plans to purchase 400 portal monitors by the end of fiscal 2003 and will deploy at least one to each U.S. port.

But Gary Jones, director of the GAO's natural resources and environment division, said it could take several years to test and install all of those monitors. She noted that portal monitors are currently in use at only one U.S. border crossing, as part of a pilot project. "And the results of that pilot are not yet available," Jones told the panel.

Jones also noted that preventing nuclear smuggling requires more than just high-tech equipment. "Customs personnel must be effectively trained in radiation science, in the use of the equipment, and in identifying and responding to alarms," Jones said, adding that Customs needs a comprehensive port-security plan and better coordination with agencies at all government levels.

Acting NNSA administrator Linton Brooks said efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling have demonstrated the need for a Homeland Security Department. "The president's proposal, when it is enacted, will help us draw together the disparate elements of the government," Brooks said.