Logistics woes plagued Army division during, after Iraq war

No military unit pushed farther and faster into Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom than the Army's 3rd Infantry Division. In just 21 days, through raging sandstorms and nearly continuous combat, the division charged 400 miles from Kuwait to Baghdad. It was a remarkable achievement for the storied division, known as the "Rock of the Marne" since World War I for its steadfast determination in battle as units around it retreated.

But ongoing problems in resupplying the division in Iraq last spring with essentials such as fuel and ammunition continually threatened the operation, according to a report recently issued by division officials.

"Many units operated dangerously low on ammunition, fuel, water and other sustainment items," according to the report.

Ammunition shortages were particularly troubling. While the division meticulously planned and coordinated replenishments, it "was completely uncoordinated at any level above. When ammunition did arrive in the ammunition supply point, it was usually in bulk, with incompatible quantities and types of rounds and fuses."

Among the logistics problems the report cited:

• The division lacked enough explosives to destroy captured enemy weapons and munitions-a critical issue because those weapons, unless destroyed, could easily be turned against U.S. forces on the battlefield.
• Turret mechanics for Bradley fighting vehicles lacked training and parts necessary to repair the vehicles' navigation systems and communications equipment.
• Combat service support units intended to resupply units on the battlefield were unprepared for security requirements, and lacked machine gun mounts and adequate communications equipment. Because the supply units could not secure themselves during convoys, combat units had to divert assets to secure them.
• A shortage of trucks hindered the division's ability to get supplies. Military planners had expected that Kuwait would be able to fill trucking shortfalls, but that assumption proved incorrect.
• Water trailer tanks provided for the division's headquarters support unit proved insufficient to handle the unit's consumption, which exceeded 400 gallons per day.
• Logisticians were unable to monitor the movement of and maintain communication with forces on the battlefield, making it difficult for them to anticipate and support logistics requirements.

Also contributing to the poor transition to postwar operations was a severe shortage of civil affairs troops-those soldiers trained to work with civilians to reestablish basic public services, such as water and electricity. According to the report, the blueprint by which civil affairs units were employed was "deficient in the following areas: manning, weapons, vehicles and communications."

The 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion, which was assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division in the attack on Baghdad, was too small for the job. The division needed 15 teams of civil affairs soldiers to support its maneuver battalions, brigade headquarters and tactical operations center, yet the 422nd was able to provide only five such teams. In addition, the teams didn't have enough firepower to defend themselves and their communications equipment was not always compatible with the units they were supposed to be supporting.

The report emphasized the need for earlier and better postwar planning in the future, particularly in prioritizing the protection of infrastructure, administrative buildings, financial institutions and historic, cultural and religious sites. "Without prioritizing, the unit will find itself protecting unimportant sites without enough forces to protect important sites," the report said.