Federal commission outlines Sept. 11 plot

The federal commission investigating the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks released an outline Wednesday of how the plot was carried out, finding that plans were much more ambitious than the actual attacks and that an informant told the government in the summer of 2001 that al Qaeda was sending operatives into the country.

Some of the more significant findings in the 20-page report include:

• al Qaeda considered hijacking up to 10 planes in the United States and possibly other planes in the South Pacific;
• no credible evidence was found that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on the attacks;
• no evidence was found that foreign governments, such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, financed the attacks;
• and that immigration laws appeared to have been more of a deterrent than counterterrorism policy.

The findings were limited, however, because the commission was not allowed to directly interview 9/11 conspirators and captured al Qaeda members. Instead, the panel submitted written questions to government interrogators and had to rely on assertions reportedly made by detainees, some of which have been inconsistent.

"We originally wanted to have one of our people interrogate those co-conspirators," said former Rep. Timothy Roemer, D-Ind., a commission member. "The [Defense Department] and CIA resisted that approach; they said it would interrupt the interrogation method."

Roemer does not believe, however, that the lack of access compromised the report. The commission is expected to issue a comprehensive final report at the end of July.

"Ultimately, I think we have a very thorough report. The difficulty comes down to assessing the credibility of those co-conspirators' statements," Roemer said. "We had to settle for second best. Does second best give you a first-rate report? I think it does. I think this report is really strongly supplemented, factually based and very thorough."

The document offers only six paragraphs on how the plot was financed. The attacks are estimated to have cost between $400,000 and $500,000, but the commission has been unable to determine the origin of that money. The bulk of it is traced to alleged plot mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, but where he obtained the money "remains unknown at this time."

Commission chairman retired Gov. Thomas Kean, R-N.J, said several Islamic charities mainly in Saudi Arabia provided funding for the plot. The commission's staff found that a CIA operative reported in June 2001 that Mohammed was sending operatives to the United States. Roemer and Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste challenged testimony made by officials in previous hearings that the U.S. government did not have sufficient information that an attack in the country was coming, and asked how the government responded to the June 2001 information on Mohammed.

"What strikes me as extraordinary is that we only received this information a few weeks ago, yet the CIA had this information as early as June 2001," Ben-Veniste said. He noted that the information was not included in an Aug. 6 presidential daily briefing the CIA put together for President Bush titled, "Bin Laden Determined to Strike Inside the United States," even though U.S. intelligence officials were warning over the summer that attacks against U.S. interests were imminent.

Rudolph Rousseau, chief of the CIA Review Group, told the commission that the information on Mohammed was "interesting" and disseminated across agencies, including the FBI's counterterrorism division, the White House, the State Department, the Treasury Department and the Secret Service.

"This pointed to the possibility of [Mohammed] doing something inside the United States," Rousseau said. He said it was part of "rumbling from the camps that something was going to happen in the United States." He added that most reports of threats concerned possible attacks overseas, but "there was this deep, droning undercurrent of concern … that we had to be careful at home."

He said the information was incorporated into the general threat reporting during that summer.

Ben-Veniste told reporters after the hearing: "The fact that we have received new information makes it clear that by the time we write our report, we won't have all the information."

The scope and timing of the attacks changed due to several circumstances, including the inability of hijackers to fully exploit immigrations and customs laws, obtain visas and enter the country, the report said.

Mohammed said his initial plan involved hijacking 10 planes to attack targets on the East and West coasts, including CIA and FBI headquarters, nuclear power plants and the tallest buildings in California and Washington State, per the report.

Mohammed realized, however, that two operatives, Khallad bin Attash and Abu Bara al Taizi, would not be able to obtain U.S. visas because they were from Yemen, not Saudi Arabia, according to the report. In response, Mohammed wanted the Yemeni operatives to hijack U.S. commercial planes on Pacific routes from Southeast Asia and explode them in mid-air or crash them into U.S. targets in Japan, Singapore or Korea. In the end, Osama bin Laden reportedly cancelled the Southeast Asia part of the operation.

Bin Laden also wanted the attacks carried out before Sept. 11--as early as May 12, 2001, to coincide with the seven-month anniversary of the attack on the USS Cole, the report said.

Another suspected hijacker, Mohamed al Kahtani, was denied access to the country by immigration officials in early August 2003 at Orlando International Airport.

"Given the catastrophic results of the 9/11 attacks, it is tempting to depict the plot as a set plan executed to near perfection. This would be a mistake," the report concludes. "The 9/11 conspirators confronted operational difficulties, internal disagreements and even dissenting opinions within the leadership of al Qaeda. In the end, the plot proved sufficiently flexible to adapt and evolve as challenges arose."

CIA and FBI officials who testified during the hearing said they believe al Qaeda is still planning attacks against the United States, possibly within the next few months.