Covert tests reveal airport screening failures

Undercover tests of aviation screening operations revealed widespread problems, raising concerns that explosives and weapons could get into airport sterile areas and checked baggage systems, the Homeland Security Department's inspector general said Wednesday.

Covert tests of the Transportation Security Administration's screeners and equipment were conducted at hundreds of airports across the country from July to November 2003. The bulk of the report remains classified, but an eight-page summary was released Wednesday. The report is based on interviews with employees and officials at relevant agencies, direct observations and document reviews.

"Improvements are needed in the screening process to ensure that dangerous prohibited items are not being carried into the sterile areas of heavily used airports or do not enter the checked baggage system," the report states. "There were four areas that caused most of the test failures and were in need of improvement: training; equipment and technology; policy and procedures; and management and supervision."

The investigation found, however, that TSA has made "significant improvements" since testing concluded almost a year ago, and is working to implement the inspector general's recommendations.

TSA spokesman Darrin Kayser said the agency has progressed in every area identified in the report.

"Since the completion of the report, TSA has significantly enhanced its training, technology and tactics to ensure that explosives and prohibited items do not get on aircraft, and the [inspector general] recognized our significant advances," he said. "Our goal is to consistently improve security, and each day we're building on the already strong system of security we've got in place. This report shows just how far we've come in the last year."

According to the report, most failures found at screening checkpoints were due to a lack of recurrent training for screeners.

In October and November 2003, TSA initiated a screener performance improvement program and a recurrent training program. Kayser said 99 percent of screeners passed all three phases.

The report added, however, that the four problem areas should not be viewed in isolation because they overlap. For example, the failure of screeners to follow a standard operating procedure may reflect the failure of supervisors and managers to train them or monitor their performance adequately.

In the area of management, the report concluded that supervisors and screening managers need to be more attentive in identifying and correcting improper or inadequate screener performance.

"Screening managers and supervisors should receive specific training in detecting and correcting improper screening performance and should have that aspect of their responsibility made an element of their performance evaluations," the report states.

Kayser said TSA now trains screening supervisors. He said about 3,770 supervisors have gone through a course offered by the Agriculture Department Graduate School since August 2003. With regard to equipment and technology, the report found that screening operations would benefit from the use of multi-view X-ray machines, backscatter X-rays and an expanded library of objects for the Threat Image Projection system.

For example, inspectors found instances where a walk-through metal detector was set off, but screeners failed to resolve the alarm properly.

"We recommended that TSA aggressively pursue the development and deployment of innovations and improvements to aviation security technologies, particularly for use at the screening checkpoint," the report said. "TSA agreed with our recommendation and is working to implement it."

Kayser said the TSA lab in Atlanta, Ga., is examining the use of backscatter and multi-view technologies. Backscatter technology displays both organic and inorganic materials hidden on a person's body. With it, X-rays deflected off dense materials such as metal or plastic produce a darker image than those deflected off skin. The TIP system is a computer program that displays fictitious images of threat items in the actual image of passenger bags, or projects entirely fictitious bags -- with or without threat items -- onto an X-ray monitor.

Kayser said TSA also plans to deploy 10 new explosives-detection portals at airports at the beginning of the new fiscal year. On Wednesday, TSA announced the deployment of explosives trace-detection document scanners at three airports. The scanners can "sniff" passenger documents such as boarding passes and drivers' licenses for traces of explosives, and will be used at Los Angeles International, John F. Kennedy International in New York City and O'Hare International in Chicago.

With regard to policy and procedures, the report states: "There are several areas where a change in screening checkpoint [standard operating procedures] could increase the effectiveness of the screening process. TSA is evaluating our recommended changes."