Forward Observer: Rumsfeld's Potted Plants

Congress in 1986 tried mightily to make it easier for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to speak loud and clear to the president about what he really thought about the military issues of the moment. But here we are, 20 years later in the middle of another divisive war, and the Joint Chiefs chairman still looks like a potted plant as he stands beside the secretary of Defense month after month, seemingly agreeing with everything he says.

The congressional stiffening effort was called the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. One of the act's main objectives was to free the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the topmost military officer in the land, to tell the president exactly what he -- and he alone -- thought. Because of Goldwater-Nichols, its architects hoped, the president would no longer get useless, muddled military advice.

The new law scrapped the requirement that the Joint Chiefs chairman get the uniformed chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps to agree with what he was going to say to the president before he said it.

In voting for Goldwater-Nichols, lawmakers were agreeing with this complaint registered by the Senate Armed Services Committee: "Existing law designates the corporate JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] as the principal military advisers. Unfortunately, the assignment of this responsibility to the JCS as a corporate body has usually induced the members to harmonize their differences into a single position. Too often the resulting advice does not offer clear, meaningful options on which the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense can base their decisions.

"Therefore, these officials have often relied upon civilian staffs for the joint military advice that they should have received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the judgment of the Committee, this has been one of the principal causes for the growth in civilian advisers to the Secretary of Defense and the diminution of the role of professional military advice in defense decision making."

Goldwater-Nichols became the law of the land on Oct. 1, 1986, and still is. It states that "the chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense." The act also is designed to unfetter the chiefs to give their personal views on military matters to Congress, stating that "after first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he considers appropriate."

OK. The law is clear on the chiefs' authority to speak their minds to both the executive and legislative branches of government. Are these four star officers doing so right now on Iraq and the size of their forces?

Joint Chiefs Chairman Peter Pace told me in a recent conversation that he takes his legal obligation to speak truth to power seriously and does so, even if it should mean disagreeing with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in private conversations with President Bush.

True or not, Pace's self portrait is not the one a disturbing number of junior and mid-level officers are carrying about Pace in their heads nowadays. He and fellow four stars heading the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps are caught in Credibility Gap as Rumsfeld stamps out dissent.

"I feel I'm working for a bunch of politicians," said one outstanding officer of the generals and admirals he works for. "Only in their not-for-attribution speeches at the war colleges they say they need more troops for Iraq. Gen. Zinni is my hero." Retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni -- former commander of U. S. Central Command, which includes Iraq -- has spoken out publicly about the folly of invading and occupying Iraq.

Besides the widespread perception within the officer corps that their seniors are afraid to stand up to Rumsfeld on troops needed for Iraq, I keep running into other evidence of disillusionment among the operators in uniform.

Critics complain that once again the generals and admirals are favoring toys over boys while refusing to speak truth to power on manpower needs. Specifically, officers below the top complain that Army leaders are putting futuristic systems ahead of the need for more troops; that the Air Force is letting the F-22 drain dollars from more pressing needs; that the admirals are favoring futuristic ships over sailors; that Marine generals continue to shoot themselves in the foot by saying "can do" to Rumsfeld rather than demanding a much bigger Corps.

Retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton recently wrote in The New York Times that "in the five years Mr. Rumsfeld has presided over the Pentagon I have seen a climate of groupthink become dominant and a growing reluctance by experienced military men and civilians to challenge the notions of the senior leadership."

Houston, I'd say we have a problem. Goldwater-Nichols, as good as it was, obviously was not enough to get rid of the groupthink at the top of the nation's military. Congress owes it to itself and the country to call in the chiefs and ask them point blank if they are really speaking their minds on Iraq and other life-and-death issues.

And if not, why not?