GAO criticizes Defense combat supply operations

Despite years of efforts to establish an efficient multiservice logistics system, the U.S. military still lacks a comprehensive strategy for joint supply operations in combat, cannot account for more than 54,000 shipping containers sent to Iraq and Afghanistan and is hindered by multiple computer systems that cannot exchange data.

And although capable of moving massive amounts of material and troops over long distances to prepare for combat, the armed services still have problems keeping track of supplies and spare parts, resulting at times in shortages for troops in the field or wasteful overstocking of material.

Those were some of the findings of two Government Accountability Office reports presented to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Government Management Subcommittee Tuesday.

The hearing was the subcommittee's fourth attempt since 2005 to force greater efficiency in the military's supply chain management system, which has been on GAO's "high-risk management" list for 17 straight years. That was "far too long," Government Management Subcommittee Chairman Daniel Akaka, D-Hawaii, and ranking member George Voinovich, R-Ohio, both declared.

The hearings into the supply management problems were started when the leadership positions of Akaka and Voinovich were reversed and they both stated their determination to get the system off the black list.

"Supply chain management is critical to our security. It affects the safety of men and women in uniform" currently fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Akaka said.

Voinovich said he was concerned about the issue because of the potential for waste in a system that consumes $162 billion a year and because an ineffective supply chain "can have a direct and negative impact on the warfighter."

The two senators and William Solis, GAO director of defense capabilities management, noted substantial improvements in the military's management of its supply system into the Central Command area since the beginning of the conflicts there. But Solis said the promised comprehensive strategy for integrating the multifaceted supply system was not expected until next summer and the military still lacked metrics to measure progress toward a better system.

But Akaka expressed concern over more basic problems, such as the inability to account for the 54,000 large steel shipping containers, which forced the military to pay extra for failing to return them on time and to spend $203 million to buy more than 25,000 from the owners.

He also questioned why the military was having so much trouble using the radio frequency identification technology that firms like Wal-Mart use to track their goods.

Jack Bell, deputy undersecretary of Defense for logistics and material readiness, however, cited improvements the system has made, including cutting the time between a deployed unit's request for material and its delivery from 24 days to 15 and creation of several organizations to provide integrated management of the supply system.

Air Force Gen. Norton Schwartz, commander U.S. transportation command, said many of the containers that were not returned had been used for storage, shelter or protective barriers during the early days in the combat zone. And he pointed out that the military has different supply problems than commercial entities because "Wal-Mart's stores don't move, but our units do."