IG: Energy fails to track tactical weapons and sensitive equipment adequately

The Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration needs to do a better job of managing excess tactical weapons and sensitive equipment used to secure facilities, according to a recent review of inventory controls at the agency.

The agency's failure to properly identify thousands of superfluous weapons at some facilities as excess materiel prevented other facilities and federal law enforcement entities from reusing them, incurring millions of dollars in unnecessary costs, Rickey R. Hass, Energy's deputy inspector general for audit services reported on Tuesday.

"The majority of these weapons were reported as being in good working order and had only recently been identified by security officials as unneeded even though some of them had been in storage for up to 15 years," Hass wrote.

On the positive side, auditors had no trouble finding the weapons and materiel identified in inventory records: "We were able to locate and verify accountability over the items of defensive and tactical equipment we selected for review. Specifically, we took statistical samples of weapons, ammunition and other related equipment, and were able to verify their existence," the report said.

The stockpiles of excess weapons at some locations are the result of changing security strategies at those facilities in recent years. For example, the Hanford Site in Richland, Wash., purchased $1.6 million worth of weapons and ammunition after a 2005 rule was published upgrading security requirements there. But in 2006, the Energy Department decided to return the site to its previous security level, leaving Hanford with a significant stockpile of unnecessary weapons. Instead of declaring the weapons as excess materiel and therefore available for use elsewhere, officials at Hanford put them in storage.

Similar situations occurred elsewhere at the agency. Besides the Hanford Site, auditors discovered excess weapons stockpiles at the National Training Center, the Office of Secure Transportation and Sandia National Laboratory, all near Albuquerque, N.M.; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, Calif., and the Nevada Test Site.

"Even though the weapons could potentially be used by others, sites had not made these unneeded weapons available by officially declaring them as excess and entering them into the Energy Asset Disposal System," the report said.

Auditors also found problems with the tracking of sensitive equipment. For example, the Idaho National Laboratory considers night vision and thermal imaging equipment to be sensitive, but it does not classify sights and scopes for equipment, which can cost as much as $10,000, as sensitive property.

"Because Idaho does not consider these items to be sensitive, they were not tracked and therefore could be more susceptible to theft and misuse," the report noted. As a result, auditors were unable to determine the number or value of sights and scopes at Idaho.

Auditors recommended NNSA's director of the Office of Management and the senior procurement executive develop policies and procedures for declaring weapons and equipment excess and making items available for others to use. They also recommended the agency improve guidance for identifying high-risk and sensitive property.

NNSA generally concurred with the auditors' recommendations.