Commission on wartime contracting hears advice from special IG

One thing became clear during the inaugural hearing of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan: The panel certainly has its work cut out.

The hearing -- held on Monday in the Caucus Room of the Russell Senate Building -- featured the release of a 450-plus page report from the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction outlining lessons from past projects that would benefit ongoing work in Afghanistan and future projects. SIGIR Stuart Bowen was one of four inspectors general and three lawmakers who testified before the panel, established in January 2008.

Bowen's report, "Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience," was the result of hundreds of interviews with key participants in the reconstruction effort, from senior U.S. and Iraqi officials such as former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and former interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, to rank-and-file military service members, civilians and contractors. It detailed Iraq reconstruction from mid-2002 through fall 2008, providing 13 main findings applicable to future contingencies.

"The United States government was unprepared and ill-equipped to mount a major contingency relief and reconstruction program in Iraq in 2003," Bowen told the commission. "For the last six years we have been on a steep learning curve."

Detailed joint planning with host country officials is "perhaps the most important prerequisite for success after security," Bowen testified. Coordination with Iraqi officials improved only gradually over the course of reconstruction, the report found. Bowen said future programs must be geared toward indigenous priorities.

The report also encouraged the development of new federal acquisition regulations for wartime contracting. "The standard FAR's complicated contracting regulations, which can be further modified by agency rules, should be knitted into a single set of simplified, uniform rules for conflict environments that all contracting agencies would have to use," it stated.

The SIGIR echoed widespread calls for a large corps of well-trained, experienced contracting officers ready to be deployed during a contingency operation. Similarly, the government should establish a diverse pool of pre-qualified contractors with reconstruction expertise, the watchdog recommended.

Michael Thibault, majority co-chairman of the commission, said it does not intend to duplicate solid work already performed, including SIGIR investigations and audits.

"One of our tasks, in fact, is to conduct a thorough review of the existing literature of investigations of wartime contracting to identify lessons learned, best practices identified, and recommendations for reform -- and to establish a comprehensive research library," he said.

Other commission mandates include examining federal reliance on contracting; contractor use of force; contract management and oversight by government agencies; waste, fraud and abuse; and potential legal violations from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"We are not interested in witch hunts or catering to personal agendas or staging new debates on old decisions, except in so far as looking at those decisions can lead to an improved decision-making process in the future," Thibault said.

Sen. Claire McCaskill, D-Mo., chairwoman of the new ad hoc Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, said the bipartisan commission has the luxury, and responsibility, of performing oversight without worrying about political consequences.

"You can do your work without fear or favor," McCaskill said. "You shouldn't care whose toes you step on."

The panel "will have no greater ally than the SIGIR," said Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, ranking member of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. She praised "Hard Lessons" as a "tough, no-holds barred report that will give [the commission] tremendous insights."

Sen. Jim Webb, D-Va., said the commission's task "ranks as one of the most important oversight obligations we face today," and urged the panel to be aggressive in investigating systemic problems in wartime contracting, as well as the government's reliance on contractors to do what could be considered inherently governmental work, such as providing security in combat zones and tactical training for the military.

The commission will publish an interim report to Congress in May, with a final report due late in the summer of 2010. It plans to hold numerous hearings. Thibault vowed additional reports as issues and discoveries warrant.

Other recommendations and findings in "Hard Lessons" included:

• Security is necessary for large-scale reconstruction to succeed;
• Developing the capacity of people and systems is as important as bricks-and-mortar projects;
• Soft programs focused on democracy and community-building as opposed to physical infrastructure improvement are an important complement to military operations in insecure environments;
• Reconstruction is an extension of political strategy;
• Executive authority at levels below the president is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of contingency relief and reconstruction operations;
• Uninterrupted oversight is essential to ensure taxpayer value in contingency operations;
• An integrated management structure and management information system are needed to effectively oversee interagency reconstruction efforts;
• Outsourcing management to contractors should be limited because it complicates lines of authority in contingency reconstruction operations;
• The U.S. government must develop a human resources management system capable of meeting the demands of a large-scale contingency relief and reconstruction operation;
• The U.S. government must strengthen its capacity to manage contractors that carry out reconstruction work in contingency relief and reconstruction operations;
• Diplomatic, development and regional expertise should be expanded to ensure a sufficient supply of qualified personnel in contingency reconstruction operations.