Investigators say NASA culture partly to blame for shuttle explosion

A lax safety culture at NASA, in addition to organizational and funding problems, led to the explosion of the space shuttle Columbia and the death of seven astronauts in February, investigators announced Tuesday.

While a piece of insulating foam caused the actual explosion, the independent 13-member Columbia Accident Investigation Board said complacency, poor communication, a rush to meet self-imposed deadlines and other organizational problems at the agency dating as far back as the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger in 1986 also played a role in the Columbia disaster.

"These repeating patterns mean that flawed practices embedded in NASA's organizational system continued for 20 years and made substantial contributions to both accidents," the board said in its report, released Tuesday.

"These organizational problems are just as important as the foam," said retired Navy Adm. Harold Gehman, the board's chairman. "Schedules are not bad. They're good management tools," Gehman added. "But our concern is various places in the organization are denying there was schedule pressure and other [parts] are screaming that there were schedule pressures."

Gehman and the board members spent nearly seven months studying the culture and organizational structure of the space agency, eventually concluding that NASA lacks the checks and balances needed to ensure a safe environment. That situation has been exacerbated by years of cost cutting and "fluctuating priorities," the board found. Without organizational change and focused leadership, a third shuttle accident could occur, board members warned during a press conference at the National Transportation Safety Board in Washington.

"I think the whole tragedy is a massive stop and rethink point," said board member Steven Wallace, director of the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Accident Investigation. "It didn't get fixed last time; there has to be a different approach."

The board's 29 recommendations include adopting a shuttle schedule that is based on available resources, creating an independent technical review board and a separate safety board, and requiring annual reports from NASA to Congress on progress in implementing the board's recommendations.

Enforcement must come from Congress and the White House, Gehman said. "I don't believe we should just trust NASA." NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe said the board's recommendations were "a blueprint" for the agency.

"We have accepted the findings and will comply with the recommendations to the best of our ability," O'Keefe said. "The board has provided NASA with an important road map as we determine when we will be fit to fly again."