Big Tent

The Thanksgiving terrorist attacks in Mumbai are becoming part of the debate over how Gov. Janet Napolitano should manage the Department of Homeland Security when she takes over in January. In a Wednesday speech, Michael Chertoff urged Napolitano to keep the Federal Emergency Management Agency in DHS:

"Emergencies don't come neatly packaged in stovepipes," he said, addressing the argument by some groups that the Federal Emergency Management Agency should be removed from the department because FEMA's mission is to respond to natural disasters and the department's main mission is to prevent terrorist attacks. Chertoff argued that when different agencies plan and train together they are better suited to respond to disasters of all varieties.

But there were clearly other forces at work in Mumbai. A big story in the New York Times yesterday lays out a whole range of preparedness issues that prevented Indian security forces from responding quickly and effectively to the terrorist attacks. The initial responders didn't have bulletproof vests, much less modern weaponry. The National Security Force only has 7,400 commandos, making it hard to mobilize enough people quickly to respond to a major attack. In a tragic echo of the faulty radios firefighters had to rely on during September 11, Mumbai beat cops don't have their own radios. And that doesn't even begin to address the low salaries, utter lack of weapons training, and corruption that local security forces have to deal with. All of these things are an argument for paying, training, and equipping law enforcement officers in Mumbai and here at home. But they're not necessarily evidence for a certain organizational chart.