Highly Placed Warning Could Backfire

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ohnson has arrived at that heady but dangerous crease where the senior civil service meets the political appointees who officially represent the administration's views. Life at this border is at its most fascinating and most vulnerable with the appearance of a new administration, especially when it brings with it innovative legislative initiatives.

Before Johnson proceeds further with his views, he must ask himself whether the problems he sees in the new procedures are truly life-threatening to the project. Who else has he spoken with, and is he the only one who sees this fiscal fiasco coming? Might there be countervailing factors of which he is not aware? Is the risk of serious loss to the program that obvious and that unavoidable? Have his concerns been taken seriously enough that they are likely to be addressed at higher levels within the administration? If his answers to these questions do not eliminate or sufficiently reduce his concern, then this is a defining issue worth risking one's career over.

Johnson should write his analysis. Doing so will force him to be clear and concise in his thinking about the issues. A cogent written analysis that others can read and reflect on is a more persuasive tool than an extemporaneous oral presentation. The fact that the document also may serve to cover his posterior is not insignificant.

Cavendish, representing the new political team, appears to be a reasonable person. While Johnson may believe that he can no longer debate the issue of concurrence with the new coinsurance procedures, a fresh approach can yield positive results. Johnson can address the underlying issues and propose practical alternatives that may reduce the risks he has identified. If some of these suggestions slow down the project, that may give reasonable people the opportunity to reconsider their views.

Building a consensus and protecting one's future require more than linear action. Johnson should try to solicit the support of the most senior civil servant in his system who has gained the trust of the new political team. If he can convince that person of the validity of his position, he will have a very useful ally. If he cannot, that may be a sign that he needs to reconsider his analysis.

All Johnson's efforts to look for additional support, both within and outside agency, must be weighed against the danger that he will be perceived as disloyal or negative. Once he been labeled as such, his advice, no matter how valuable, will simply not be heard. To avoid this, he must continue to meet the formal requirements of his job and show support for the underlying privatization policy. Going outside the channels and especially taking his case outside his agency are the steps most likely to backfire. Such actions should be taken only if all else has failed and he still believes that the impending damage is real, certain and extensive.

It would be satisfying if Johnson prevailed, and received credit for his efforts. It is just as likely, however, that he will succeed but receive no credit. New administrations-and new administrators-often do not like to be saved from error, especially if the rescuer is a civil servant. On the other hand, if Johnson is proved wrong or his persistence is not well-received, he may still be able to avoid serious damage to his career by having kept his focus on substance and not on vindication of his beliefs. His career may be delayed, but that risk is inherent in his position and in his decision to press his issues.

Arnold Intrater, L.L.B., is a consultant with the National Academy of Public Administration. A federal government attorney for 28 years, his service included high-level positions at the Treasury Department, the Executive Office of the President, the White House and the Peace Corps.

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