It Doesn't Take A Rocket Scientist

ix weeks into his job as head of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Sean O'Keefe was 195 feet above Launch Pad 39A at Florida's Kennedy Space Center, shuffling across an open-grate footbridge toward the cockpit of shuttle Columbia. "Jeez!" he thought to himself, "Imagine all the people who have done this over the storied history of this agency, who stepped onto this platform and knew they were doing something that was really quite remarkable." It was Feb. 15, and the power-suited executive was treading the same path that seven pressure-suited astronauts would take on a repair call to the Hubble Space Telescope in just a matter of days. "It suddenly makes sense why the risk and the obsession with safety are compatible," he later told reporters.

O'Keefe's observations were a tad ironic coming from someone who could be perceived as the Grim Reaper of space budgets. After a year of castigating NASA for its financial missteps, one of the agency's sharpest critics is in charge. Fresh out of a top spot in the Office of Management and Budget, O'Keefe has put the $96 billion International Space Station on two years' probation for cost overruns, restricted the shuttle fleet to four supporting flights a year, frozen the station crew size at three, and proposed to cut planned science work by as much as 40 percent. These cutbacks are just the beginning of an effort by the White House insider to focus NASA's vision.

Since the end of Apollo, the project that put 12 Americans on the moon between 1969 and 1972, NASA has been an agency in search of a mission. O'Keefe, the 10th person to lead NASA since its creation in 1958, arguably shoulders the heaviest burden of all-to reconnect the agency with its research and development roots, or allow it to become irrelevant and extinct. "The fundamental question around here is going to be, 'What's the point?'" O'Keefe says without a hint of sarcasm.

O'Keefe, a prematurely graying 46-year-old with a youthful sense of humor, boasts close ties to the Bush administration. He replaces Daniel Goldin, a persuasive visionary who enjoyed the longest tenure of any administrator in NASA's history-almost 10 years. Goldin stepped down in November after serving three presidents-George W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Bush's father. Goldin's orders were to rescue the space station from almost certain cancellation by Congress and to prove the concept of low-cost, short-schedule, high-performance space flight. His "faster, better, cheaper" plan for building and launching robot probes achieved questionable results but nevertheless redefined U.S. planetary exploration. By making Russia a space station partner, he saved the station-by a single vote in the House in 1993-but left it years behind schedule and billions of dollars over budget. "Sean O'Keefe's job is to apply what we've learned about low-cost missions to a mega-program that's organized exactly like Project Apollo," says American University Professor Howard McCurdy, author of the NASA History Series volume, Faster, Better Cheaper: Low-Cost Innovations in the U.S. Space Program (Johns Hopkins University Press, December 2001).

Cost overruns threaten the space station and the international goodwill it was designed to foster. U.S. contributions have grown from $17.4 billion in 1993 to at least $30 billion today. The actual cost is not known because NASA keeps its books so badly. Management evaluators charged with calculating the cost last fall came away exasperated, with little choice but to endorse a Bush administration cost-cutting plan-written by O'Keefe-that eliminates $1 billion worth of station components. The move angered NASA's 15 international partners, who argued that scaling back to the stage called "U.S. core complete" scuttles their scientific research. European Space Agency ministers threatened to scale back their own contributions in protest.

NASA's signature program is in serious trouble, and Congress doubts the agency's ability to manage big projects. In late February, OMB singled out NASA for deteriorating financial performance and the accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers blamed insufficient documentation for its unfinished audit of NASA's financial statements for 2001. "The fact that NASA's books are in such disarray should be a cause of real alarm," says Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, R-Calif., chairman of the House Science Committee's space and aeronautics panel. Unless O'Keefe clamps down on the cost of human space flight, it will devour money for other high-priority missions. "There will not be a massive infusion of funds for NASA," says Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee's science, technology and space panel. "Mr. O'Keefe's principal challenge will be to refocus the agency and use existing federal funds for carrying out NASA's original goals."

The bottom line is the top priority.

O'Keefe insists the space station's money problems are manageable, and not at the expense of other things NASA wants to do "Everything is on the table," he says. "It has to be." That means sorting out what the agency does best-cutting-edge scientific research and leap-ahead technology development-and handing the rest to industry. "We've dedicated ourselves . . . to a really important calling, which is to do some things that others wouldn't dare, because they either couldn't see it as profitable or were concerned about the risk involved," O'Keefe explains.

ENTREPRENEURSHIP REBORN

At least three initiatives address perennial problems at NASA: outmoded accounting tools, inadequate skill mixes, and the shrinking commercial space market. Armed with the reform blueprint and a host of management liberties spelled out in the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act that created NASA, O'Keefe intends to push further privatization of the shuttle, entrust space station operations to a nongovernmental organization, and consign more field center functions to industry or academia. Reviving the entrepreneurial spirit that characterized NASA at its birth almost 44 years ago is the key to its future success, O'Keefe says. "It is the most important item on my agenda in the near term."

While emphasizing greater competition outside NASA, O'Keefe aims to foster closer collaboration inside. He is continuing a review instigated by Goldin that aims to rid the agency of duplicate facilities and programs. Before leaving NASA in November, Goldin hinted at the outcome: mothballing or privatizing little-used wind tunnels, consolidating space science and propulsion research now done at competing facilities, and even closing one or more of NASA's 10 field centers. Goldin designated each field center as a "center of excellence" to coordinate work on a specific aspect of the agency's mission. For instance, the Kennedy Space Center, with its shuttle launch pads in close proximity to historic Cape Canaveral, is the center of excellence for spaceport technology. But O'Keefe avoids using "center of excellence" because he believes the term fosters unhealthy competitiveness and infighting, not collaboration.

No matter what O'Keefe does to trim the fiscal fat at NASA, he will fight lawmakers for the knife. When he presented his 2003 budget request to the House Science Committee Feb. 27, California and Florida already were duking it out over his decision to move space shuttle overhauls from Palmdale, Calif., to the Kennedy Space Center. Also, Sen. Barbara Mikulski, D-Md., was quick to criticize O'Keefe for urging closer ties between NASA and the Defense Department in nearly every one of his public appearances since the Senate confirmed him in December.

The former Navy secretary wants to share unclassified technology research and development, merge launch vehicle development and operations, and resume use of the shuttle to deploy spy satellites. The Navy recently revealed that for the first time ever, it had been using unclassified NASA satellite imagery to help guide ships and planes in the war in Afghanistan-with the support of Congress, even of Mikulski.

Resurrecting NASA's once-close relationship with the Pentagon could shift costs, give the shuttle more work and help O'Keefe convince the public that the Bush administration is genuinely interested in space projects. But what NASA needs most, in his opinion, is a compelling vision. "If you ask anyone-neighbors, friends, professional colleagues-do they know anything about NASA, the answer immediately is 'Yes, absolutely,' " the administrator told employees at NASA's headquarters as he marked his first month on the job. "When you say specifically, 'And which programs are we engaged in . . . that have real meaning for individuals?' you get a range of answers to that."

On April 12, O'Keefe returned to his Syracuse University stomping grounds, the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, to outline his strategic vision for NASA. The vision is focused on scientific goals and not necessarily exploration of any destination. Absent a political imperative like the one that propelled the United States to the moon ahead of the Soviet Union, O'Keefe says, destinations are less important. A major component of the vision is a 4-year-old initiative by O'Keefe's predecessor to make teachers part of the regular astronaut corps. O'Keefe sealed Daniel Goldin's promise to Christa McAuliffe understudy Barbara Morgan with a date-sometime in 2004-for her first space mission. Goldin had tapped Morgan as a bona fide astronaut in 1998, 12 years after the disaster that killed McAuliffe, who had been a payload specialist aboard the ill-fated shuttle Challenger. Morgan's flight would be the first in series for a class of so-called educator mission specialists yet to be chosen. "The time has come for NASA to complete the mission," O'Keefe told the Syracuse audience. The confirmation of Morgan's "voyage into history" drew applause from from Rep. Sherwood Boehlert, R-N.Y., House Science Committee chairman. "After only a few, hectic months on the job, Administrator O'Keefe has begun to articulate his vision for NASA, and I am encouraged by what I have heard," he said.

Billed by NASA as a major policy address on the agency's future, the new administrator's first big speech came just six weeks after he assigned a team of insiders to rewrite NASA's vision, mission statements and strategic plan-all of which had been criticized as vague and grandiose. The objective of the exercise, one insider says, was "to cut through all the B.S. and make it understandable outside the agency." Neither NASA's new vision-"to improve life here, to extend life to there, to find life beyond"-nor its new mission-"to understand and protect our home planet, to explore the universe and search for life, to inspire the next generation of explorers . . . as only NASA can"-got rave reviews. Rep. Ralph Hall, D-Texas, disliked it. "The best way the administrator could demonstrate his commitment to 'science-driven missions' would be to complete the International Space Station-restoring the crew size and research capabilities that successive congresses and administrations have supported," Hall said.

Sources say the new administrator is considering novel ways to launch NASA's new vision. On the short list of possibilities earlier this year was a national branding campaign designed to mimic those used by the Army, the U.S. Postal Service and the automotive industry. But recently, the NASA Education Mission, a proposed top-level consolidation of outreach projects at the field centers, has been getting the most attention.

FEWER HUMAN FLIGHTS

O'Keefe refuses to consider increasing the number of crewmembers planned for the space station before getting a firm grip on costs and a list of research priorities for the zero-gravity lab. He says the debate that has ensued since he ordered the science community to draw up a research agenda is "right up there with a good food fight." But he vows to "slide pizzas under the door as they fight it out" if it will ensure the best use of a small crew's limited time. NASA expects by late summer to have a reliable estimate of what it will take to finish the U.S. core module. Experts handpicked by the new administrator are calculating the figure with help from the Defense Department, whose antiquated accounting system got an overhaul when O'Keefe was chief financial officer there 12 years ago. The analysis will show the financial impact of architectural changes that were beyond NASA's control, according to the space station boss, Deputy Associate Administrator Michael Hawes. "There's actually been very frugal management of space station resources," says Hawes. "But has life changed since this was estimated back in 1993? Absolutely." O'Keefe won't decide before June 2003 whether to expand the station with foreign modules or stop construction at the U.S. core.

Even with O'Keefe's cutbacks, ridding the space station of fiscal waste may require the skill of a magician. A Congressional Research Service analysis issued in late February claims the Bush administration's budget still leaves the project $603 million short. "I don't think you can do magic, and I simply don't think you can do what you're expected to do with the amount of money you're going to be given under the president's budget," Rep. Vernon Ehlers, R-Mich., told O'Keefe at the House Science Committee's first hearing on NASA's budget request for 2003.

NUKES ARE BACK

As a result, the 2003 request eliminates the program, including a flyby of Pluto, which Congress put back into the 2002 budget over the White House's objections last year. O'Keefe has canceled the Pluto-Kuiper mission, scheduled for launch in 2006, as well as a mission to Jupiter's moon Europa in 2008, in favor of an initiative to develop nuclear power and propulsion systems for deep-space probes and Mars landers.

The budget request includes $125.5 million next year and $1 billion over five years for an initiative that picks up nuclear technology research and development where NASA left off in the early 1970s. Although politically controversial, new nuclear systems could improve the productivity and cost-effectiveness of future exploration. The budget request fully funds a robotic Mars program, including a Mars orbiter in 2005, but delays a Mars lander and long-range rover until 2009 so it can be augmented with advanced robotics and a radioactive electrical generator.

'BEAN COUNTER'

O'Keefe confesses he "never in a million years" thought he would serve the space agency-much less lead it. "There are more scientists, engineers and technologists in this agency who know what they're doing more than I could ever know," he says, "so, therefore, I will stick to my knitting in understanding what the management objectives are." He is, by reputation, a hard-nosed, high-quality manager who is especially adept at handling large programs. Since the Syracuse speech, however, some NASA insiders confide they have begun to worry whether O'Keefe is up to the challenges facing him. In an April 17 budget hearing, Rep. Tom DeLay, R-Texas, the majority whip, made no secret of his concerns about the agency's direction, criticizing the administrator's "timid, anemic" spending plan. "I am really disturbed by your blatant disregard of Congress' involvement in the spending process and your lack of vision and funding for human space flight," he told O'Keefe.

Clearly, the Bush administration did not want a rocket scientist running NASA. It wanted a manager who understands the intricacies of budgets and how they are put together. In O'Keefe's appointment, the administration was sending a strong message that it wants the space agency to get its costs under control, according to American University's McCurdy.

"One of Goldin's legacies is lots of broad views of future directions. What NASA needs is someone to take from those visions what is in the country's interest to move forward," explains space policy analyst John Logsdon of The George Washington University. "You don't need a rocket scientist to do that." To move NASA forward requires, the experts say, a leader who can fight the Washington battles. Engineers can do more good in the lower levels of management. "The front offices of NASA headquarters are much more about leadership for the agency and communicating the needs of the agency to the leadership of this country," says Lori Garver, who was NASA's director of strategic planning during the Clinton years.

WHITE HOUSE TIES

O'Keefe gained his reputation for merciless budget cutting at the Pentagon, where he modernized an obsolete accounting system and integrated the Marines into all aspects of Navy planning, budget and combat. At age 34, he was the Pentagon's youngest chief financial officer. One of Cheney's closest aides, O'Keefe canceled pet programs such as the Navy's A-12 attack plane, and endured the resulting controversy. He was overseeing a staff of almost 200 accountants and analysts responsible for a $281 billion budget-18 percent of all federal spending-when the first President Bush designated him acting Navy secretary in 1992. O'Keefe skippered the Navy's recovery from the Tailhook sexual harassment scandal and redefined military missions for the Navy and Marine Corps in the post-Cold War era. A Republican loyalist, O'Keefe spent the Clinton years in academia-first as a business professor and graduate school dean at Pennsylvania State University, then as a government professor and director of national security studies at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. He created the national security studies program to provide executive training for senior military and civilian Defense Department managers.

In March 2001, President Bush invited him back to public service as deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget. As the first deputy Cabinet officer appointed in the new administration, O'Keefe oversaw the preparation, management and administration of the federal budget and governmentwide management initiatives. He was intimately involved in crafting NASA's budget, developing the plan he now will implement to lift the agency out of its financial quagmire.

He wasn't the first choice for administrator, but as the search wore on and the agency's fiscal problems got worse, O'Keefe became the logical choice. The Bush administration reportedly offered the $145,100-a-year job to at least six others, all of whom refused. They included Marine Maj. Gen. Charles Bolden, commanding general of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing in San Diego, a former astronaut whom O'Keefe quickly summoned back to be the agency's chief operating officer. In March, Bolden was one day away from Senate confirmation as NASA's first deputy administrator in 10 years when the White House withdrew the nomination, saying it needed the two-star leader to help plan and execute America's continuing war against terrorism. Ultimately, the nomination fell to former astronaut Fred Gregory, who also had been associate administrator for safety and quality assurance and had served as associate administrator for space flight since December.

Some NASA officials believe that having a Cheney protégé with friends in Congress calling the shots will work to NASA's advantage. "Folks are viewing his very positive, tight connection with the president and vice president as a very good sign," says International Space Station chief Hawes. "At least the White House returns his calls," another senior agency official observes with a smirk. But the Bolden incident dealt O'Keefe's fledgling administration a significant setback and punched a hole in O'Keefe's image as a powerful player in the Bush administration and on Capitol Hill.

POSITIONING NASA TO SUCCEED

"NASA funding needs to be increased by a significant amount to ensure that the United States maintains its global leadership in space exploration, science and aeronautics," says John Douglass, president and CEO of the Aerospace Industries Association, a Washington-based trade association. Its members include 70 of the nation's top makers of aircraft, spacecraft and related components.

But significant budget increases are not in NASA's immediate future, and O'Keefe will walk a fine line between savings and safety, particularly with regard to human space flight. As the 2003 budget process began, NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel reported that astronauts are at greater risk than ever before-blaming, among other things, a lack of commitment to technological upgrades that would improve shuttle safety. The panel echoed warnings O'Keefe heard during his confirmation hearing. "You can't just keep cutting with- out paying the price," says Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla.

Prominently displayed on the coffee table in the administrator's office is a well-read copy of Powering Apollo: James E. Webb of NASA (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). The book was written by his friend, Syracuse University Professor W. Henry Lambright. It emphasizes the leadership style and management methods of a public servant whom O'Keefe idolizes.

Also not a rocket scientist, Webb was director of the Bureau of the Budget in the late 1940s before serving as NASA's second administrator from 1961 to 1968. Under his direction, the space agency undertook one of the most important projects in history. For seven years after President John F. Kennedy challenged the nation to land an American on the moon by 1969, Webb politicked, coaxed, cajoled and maneuvered for NASA in Washington. As a longtime Washington insider, he was a master of bureaucratic diplomacy and built a web of political liaisons that brought continued support and resources to accomplish Project Apollo on the schedule Kennedy had announced.

O'Keefe is in a better position than any administrator since Webb to prime NASA for spectacular achievements. "O'Keefe may not particularly dream at night of sending astronauts to Mars. But he may leave NASA structured in such a way so that, at a time and circumstance in which the country can support that, we actually will be able to accomplish such a goal," says Frank Sietzen, executive director of the Space Transportation Association, an Arlington, Va., group that advocates tourism and other private sector space developments in space.