By Air or By Sea

t's a lesson armies have learned and relearned throughout history: No matter how brilliant a leader's tactics, how well-trained the troops, or how powerful their weapons, if they can't get to the fight, those things hardly matter.

At the height of the Cold War, in 1978, officials across the U.S. government participated in a table-top planning exercise designed to test their ability to react to an attack by Warsaw Pact nations against NATO forces in Europe. They failed the test. During the simulation, the Defense Department couldn't locate more than 200,000 soldiers required by their war plans. Confusion stymied the deployment of U.S.-based troops to Europe. In one telling instance, aircraft received 27 requests to move a single unit to 27 different places. Most of the 400,000 U.S. troops already in Europe "died" within weeks because they ran out of ammunition.

Though an alarming failure, the exercise, dubbed Nifty Nugget, provided a precious bit of inspiration for the Defense bureaucracy and spawned an overhaul of the organizations and processes through which the military moves troops and materiel to the battlefield. Twelve years later, in 1990, the Defense Department tested those reforms for real when Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait. In the first three weeks of the buildup to war in what the Pentagon called Operation Desert Shield, the Defense Department moved more passengers and equipment to the Persian Gulf than it had moved to Korea during the first three months of the Korean War. By week six, Defense aircraft surpassed the records set during the 65-week Berlin Airlift. After five months, the military moved more cargo by sea to the Gulf region than the Allies transported to Russia over an 18-month period during World War II.

That's not to say that Operation Desert Shield was a resounding success in terms of moving troops and equipment. There were serious problems, most notably that it took six months to get military units and their equipment to the battlefield. Had Iraqi forces not stopped in Kuwait, the war's outcome might have been vastly different. While Defense officials have studied the lessons of the war against Iraq, so too have the United States' enemies. The overwhelming challenge for military planners has been to figure out how to get to the fight more quickly.

Much has changed since 1990. The military has begun replacing and upgrading aircraft capable of moving troops and equipment to the battlefield; it has a larger, faster fleet of ships for moving outsized vehicles and gear; it has stockpiled more military equipment in various places around the world, both on land and aboard ships, for quick transfer to where it's needed. Also, many military experts believe that improvements in weaponry have reduced the need to haul as much ammunition to the battlefield-it takes fewer munitions than ever to destroy targets and they strike with far greater precision.

Not all the changes since 1990 have been positive, however. Improvements to Army equipment have made tanks and other weapons heavier, putting a greater burden on the transport system, especially aircraft. Reductions in maintenance funding and shortages of spare parts have handicapped the fleets used for airlift and in-flight refueling of long-range aircraft. A decline in the number of U.S. commercial ships and aircraft capable of handling military equipment-critical factors in a major military mobilization-raise unsettling questions about the Defense Department's reliance on the private sector for meeting transportation needs in a crisis.

Other trends are equally troubling: Since 1990, for budgetary and political reasons, the United States has cut its total military forces by about one-third and significantly reduced the number of troops permanently stationed overseas. At the same time, troops are being deployed around the globe to increasingly remote locations, such as Afghanistan, raising complex logistical problems. Ensuring security of the expansive transportation system, much of which is controlled by the private sector, has become vital-yet difficult to achieve. As the war on terrorism continues into the foreseeable future and a long-term engagement in Iraq seems inevitable, the challenges associated with moving troops and materiel will grow.

GETTING THERE

If there's one thing military planners can count on, it's that things rarely go as planned. How you move forces to the battlefield depends on which troops are deploying, where they're going, the capabilities of hostile forces they may encounter along the way, the availability of aircraft and ships, support from allies for crossing foreign territory and ports, terrain, weather conditions, and even the U.S. political climate. Since many of the troops who run the military's transportation infrastructure are in the reserve forces, a president's willingness to activate reserve troops is another factor affecting military deployments.

Most deployment planning falls to the U.S. Transportation Command, a joint-service organization based at Scott Air Force Base, Ill. The command includes key transportation organizations in each of the services: the Army's Military Traffic Management Command at Fort Eustis, Va.; the Air Force's Air Mobility Command at Scott Air Force Base; and the Navy's Military Sealift Command in Washington.

During military training and operations, Transportation Command orchestrates the movement of troops and cargo, a complicated ballet that involves matching available lift (air and sea) with combat commanders' requirements, and then moving troops and cargo from their home bases through departure ports and airfields and ultimately to what's called the theater of operations-usually a staging area for combat operations.

If it sounds straightforward, it's not. Consider the experiences of Transportation Command planners during Operation Desert Shield. The rapidly evolving situation in Iraq required combat commanders at U.S. Central Command, the joint-service organization with war-planning jurisdiction for operations in the Middle East, to frequently adjust its deployment priorities, according to So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, a history of the Persian Gulf War deployment by Transportation Command historians James Matthews and Cora Holt. In one example, during the first three days of September 1990, the 101st Airborne Division canceled 53 airlift missions. The computer system managing deployments couldn't keep up with the frequency and magnitude of changes in airlift requirements. "At times nobody at an airport knew why an aircraft had arrived. Other times [the Military Airlift Command, now the Air Mobility Command] deployed the wrong type of aircraft or too many or too few aircraft for loads awaiting them," Matthews and Holt wrote.

Glitches in the deployment management computer systems have been resolved, military officials say, but depending on the requirements, moving forces around the globe is no less complex today than it was in 1990. In some cases, it's more complex.

"Have you ever been to Albania?" asks retired Army Col. Patrick Sweeney, a professor at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. When the Army deployed to Albania in 1999 to support the NATO air campaign against Serbian forces in Kosovo, it took five months to transport the troops. There were a number of factors hindering the deployment, but one key issue was the lack of sufficient airfields and roads that could accommodate the military. Missions to remote corners of the world are far tougher to mount, says Sweeney, who was a NATO planner for operations in Kosovo before he retired.

CRITICAL SHORTFALLS

To get forces into a theater quickly-within a matter of hours or a few days-they must be flown, along with their equipment, unless that equipment already is in the region-the military stockpiles equipment on land in friendly countries and aboard ships around the world. During the Persian Gulf War, the military wore out its fleet of C-141 Starlifters, which handled 30 percent of the cargo delivered to the Persian Gulf. About 60 of the 1960s-era aircraft remain in the fleet, down from several hundred, and those will be phased out over the next few years. Intended to fill the void left by the retirement of C-141s is the C-17 Globemaster, the first of which entered the fleet in 1993. The Air Force has purchased 90 of the 180 C-17s that have been authorized. Transportation Command chief Air Force Gen. John Handy, who also heads the Air Mobility Command, says more are needed. A study conducted by the Air Force shows the service will need at least 222 C-17s by 2005 to meet lift requirements.

The C-17 is important because it can land on dirt airfields-an increasingly important feature, given recent deployments to remote areas. Air Force and Army officials say the aircraft already has proved its worth during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, where little modern infrastructure exists. C-17s flew 47 percent of the airlift missions into the mountainous, land-locked country in the first six months of the campaign. Many of those flights were conducted at night, making operations especially difficult.

Other critical aircraft include the mammoth C-5 Galaxy, the largest transport aircraft. The C-5 can carry 270,000 pounds of cargo-about 100,000 pounds more than the C-17-but it needs longer, modern runways to operate. In addition, the aircraft is more than 30 years old and reliability is a problem. Contractor Lockheed Martin is developing a plan to re-engineer the aircraft, but the Air Force has not yet approved final plans. Typically, the C-5 flies cargo to major hubs, where it is transferred to the C-17, one of the remaining C-141s, or to the C-130 Hercules for transport to the theater of operation. The C-130 generally shuttles cargo around the battlefield. Its range is limited and it is smaller than either the C-17 or the C-141, but it can land on primitive airstrips. Beginning in 2004, Boeing is slated to overhaul about 500 of the aircraft, which entered the fleet more than four decades ago.

The military services have hundreds of lift aircraft, but hardly anyone thinks they have enough. Because different aircraft are tailored to different missions and the bulk of the planes are decades old, they cannot be used interchangeably. And the C-17, the newest, most versatile aircraft, numbers in the double-digits. "Numbers count," says Sweeney. "You can't have an aircraft in two places at once." At the height of Operation Desert Storm, 147 aircraft from Europe and the United States landed daily in the Persian Gulf region.

In a 2001 assessment, the General Accounting Office found that air transport capacity was about 30 percent below what the Defense Department requires. Of particular concern was the C-5, which averaged a mission-capable rate of 55 percent, meaning that only 57 out of 104 aircraft were available for missions. In addition, tanker aircraft, which conduct in-flight refueling for long-range transport aircraft such as the C-5 and C-17, were operating about 20 percent below requirements. Maintenance problems and shortages of spare parts accounted for most of the problems, GAO found. To deal with shortfalls, early this November, the Air Force was negotiating with Boeing Co. to lease 100 jetliners, which would be modified to conduct in-flight refueling for military aircraft.

SECURITY CONCERNS

While airlift is vital, especially in the early days of any military operation, sealift is equally critical, especially in extended military operations. Ships, with their large holds, carry the bulk of outsized military equipment, such as tanks and artillery pieces. The Military Sealift Command maintains about 40 ships, loaded with combat gear and supplies, in key places around the world, primarily in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. These pre-positioned ships are intended largely to support Marine and Army units, which most likely would be flown to the Middle East and Central Asia from the United States or Europe, in the early days of a conflict.

Most of the military equipment and supplies needed to support major conflict still would need to be shipped from the United States, military planners say. That's where the "surge" sealift fleet comes in; it includes 19 roll-on/roll-off ships and a reserve fleet of various other ships. The military began buying roll-on/roll-off ships in the 1980s, when the private sector turned to container ships for transport. The roll-on/roll-off ships are ideally suited for military equipment, which can easily be driven on and off the ships, as opposed to being loaded by cranes, saving loading time during a conflict.

Among the 19 roll-on/roll-off ships in the surge fleet are eight fast sealift ships-the speediest ships in the fleet. One fast sealift ship carries the equivalent of 130 C-5 aircraft loads. Traveling at speeds up to 33 knots, it generally can arrive anywhere it might be needed within a week. The Navy also maintains 11 large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships, ready to sail within 96 hours. The LMSRs, as they are called, have cargo space equal to eight football fields and can travel at speeds up to 24 knots. Also available, are 70 Ready Reserve Force ships, maintained by the Transportation Department's Maritime Administration in peacetime. The Ready Reserve Force ships can be readied for service in four to 20 days, depending on their status. The force includes roll-on/roll-off ships, crane ships, tankers and other vessels not readily available in the U.S. commercial sector.

While the military's air and sea transport fleets appear large to outsiders, they would be nowhere nearly large enough to handle the demands placed on them during a major military conflict. During the Persian Gulf War, commercial aircraft and ships moved 85 percent of the troops and materiel hauled to the Gulf. Even in peacetime, the military depends on the commercial sector to move most military cargo.

Not only that, but the U.S. shipping industry doesn't have nearly enough ships to handle all the military's needs. Military Sealift Command had to charter 177 foreign vessels from 34 nations to support the 1990 deployment to the Persian Gulf. Even in day-to-day operations, the military relies on allied charter ships.

The Defense Department relies on the commercial shipping industry-which increasingly includes foreign firms-to meet two-thirds of its sealift needs. With the U.S. shipping industry accounting for 1 percent of the world's market share, the growing reliance on foreign ships isn't likely to change anytime soon. Nor is the reliance on the private sector limited to the ships themselves. Indeed, the military depends on the nation's entire transportation infrastructure-railroads, the trucking industry, commercial ports-when it goes to war. There's a seemingly endless list of factors that affect military deployments, many of which are beyond the control of the Defense Department. Labor shortages or strikes, poor maintenance of roads and railways and insufficient security at ports are only some of the problems that worry military planners.

As one senior Navy official observed: "You can just imagine the threat to U.S. ports if we have to go to war. The impact on the country would be enormous."