Buck Private

If you want to gauge the security situation in Iraq, a good place to start is Baghdad International Airport. Nearly all visitors to the country arrive on one of two daily flights into what was formerly Saddam International Airport, about 10 miles west of Baghdad. Where taxis and shuttle buses once operated, now armed agents from dozens of private security companies jostle for position to await the flight arrivals. The fact that the aid workers, businesspeople and foreign government officials streaming into Iraq every day cannot safely leave the airport without arranging for armed escorts is only the first indication that life in the new Iraq is dangerous and complicated.

As the pace of reconstruction increases in the coming months, the situation will become even more complex, say military officials and private contractors working in Iraq. Some officials estimate that the ranks of private security contractors, who employ both Iraqis and foreigners, could soon exceed 250,000-more armed personnel than are among coalition troops and Iraqi security forces combined. These contractors, who operate with varying degrees of professionalism and skill, for the most part are not regulated by the Iraqi government, despite attempts to do so. They potentially will add more fuel to the already volatile mix of foreign troops and Iraqi security forces now coping with a persistent insurgency, all while the new Iraqi government is trying to assert its authority and create the foundation for democratic elections.

"Every day I'm in Baghdad I hear new names of companies that are running sizable security operations," says Trefor Williams, a former British special forces soldier who directs operations in Iraq for the private security company Diligence LLC. Williams estimates that there are between 40 and 60 security firms now working in the country, with more setting up shop daily. His own firm has about 480 employees operating in Iraq-all former military personnel-providing a range of services to clients, mostly businesses involved in reconstruction. The company provides such services as escorting contractors, finding them secure housing, and hiring and training local Iraqi guards to protect their facilities. "When they need evacuating, we offer an evacuation facility and quick reaction force. We do anything you can imagine a client would need from a security point of view," Williams says.

From a military point of view, this profusion of armed personnel on the streets of Iraqi cities presents a major challenge. Lt. Col. Len McWherter, operations officer for the Multinational Brigade Northwest, which operates in the northern sector of Iraq, says coordinating military operations not only with the activities of the fledgling Iraqi security forces-which include Iraqi military, police and border protection personnel-but also with the private security forces presents the "ultimate interoperability challenge."

It is critical that the military know where the contractors are, and that they operate according to established procedures, McWherter says. "We're the only one that can respond to assist them if something goes wrong. If they run into [a roadside bomb], or run into contact with insurgents, then we have a responsibility to react and assist as best we can."

Equally important, McWherter says, is that contractors don't unknowingly stumble into the middle of a military operation. "The difficulty comes in just sharing that information as efficiently as possible," he says.

In May, the Pentagon tried to address the challenge with the award of a $293 million contract to British firm Aegis Defense Services to coordinate and manage the activities of the various security contractors working in Iraq. Aegis also agreed to establish 75 armed security teams to protect personnel working for the U.S. Project Management Office, the government agency created to manage reconstruction contracts in Iraq.

The contract immediately raised eyebrows among industry observers and sparked a protest by American security contractor DynCorp (now owned by Computer Sciences Corp. in El Segundo, Calif.), which also had bid on the contract.

Aegis was a relatively young company with no experience in the Middle East, causing many to wonder why it was awarded the contract. In addition, the firm is run by Tim Spicer, a former lieutenant colonel in the Scots Guards who has been at the center of some controversial business deals, including a 1998 arms smuggling operation in Sierra Leone in contravention of a United Nations embargo. Spicer had been arrested in Papua New Guinea a year earlier, allegedly for recruiting mercenaries to put down an attempted coup there. He later sued the government of Papua New Guinea in Australia and won a settlement for $18 million in unpaid fees.

As a result of the DynCorp protest, the inspector general for the Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S. governing authority in Iraq before the Iraqi interim government took power June 30, launched an investigation into the contract award. That investigation was still under way in early fall, stalling the work of coordinating private security operations, military and industry officials say.

The delay has been frustrating to security contractors in Iraq, Williams says. "Aegis should be a central point for intelligence coming in from the private security sector to help others in the private security sector and the military. And they should be passing out unclassified intelligence to us so we can do our job better," he adds.

Despite the protest, McWherter says that by mid-August, Aegis had begun to fulfill the crucial role of coordinating security contractors in northern Iraq. The firm had several employees working in the brigade's operations center to begin passing information between coalition military forces and security contractors. Aegis had just begun deploying satellite communications and navigation equipment that would allow its officials working in the operations center to maintain a digital map showing the location of security contractors across northern Iraq, McWherter says.

"The reason we're so eagerly anticipating the Aegis contract is that they're to put all of this together. It gives us one-stop shopping if we have a problem with one of the private security firms," McWherter says. Still, he foresees major challenges even if the contract moves ahead under Aegis as planned. The biggest is communications. With most military communications networks classified, sharing relevant information quickly and efficiently will be critical.

"The bottom line is you have these security contractors out roaming around and when something happens, they've got to be able to get the information back to the [Aegis liaison officer in the operations center], who then has to get that information to military forces," who will be operating on a different communications network, McWherter says. "How quickly that happens is really the key. If you don't do it quickly, then you run the risk of somebody getting hurt badly."

What's more, the coalition forces are still developing the mechanisms to coordinate operations with Iraqi security forces, which are growing in number and capability every week. As Iraqi security forces grow, McWherter expects the security situation will improve and reconstruction projects will balloon, which will put more security contractors on the streets to protect those projects. "We really anticipate it becoming more complicated with increased forces throughout the battle space," he says. "The sooner we get a well-oiled machine to deconflict all this stuff the better off we'll be."

Memorandum 17

Four days before turning over governing authority to the Iraqi interim government in June, CPA administrator L. Paul Bremer signed an order aimed at regulating private security companies operating in Iraq. The order, known among security contractors as Memorandum 17, states that contractors must be vetted, licensed and registered with the Ministries of Trade and Interior. They are subject to periodic audits by the Ministry of Interior, their weapons must be registered and licensed, and they are prohibited from performing any law enforcement functions. Also, contractors are bound by a set of rules governing the use of force. Specifically, they are allowed only to use "necessary force" in self-defense, to defend individuals they are contractually obligated to defend, and "to prevent life-threatening offenses against civilians."

Before they begin any operations, all security firms must submit a minimum refundable bond of $25,000 to the Interior Ministry (the ministry reserves the right to charge more). Any firms that violate the terms of Memorandum 17 might forfeit their bonds. In addition, firms "must submit evidence that they have sufficient public liability insurance to cover possible claims against them for a reasonable amount." If insurance is not "practicable," firms may seek an exemption from the requirement.

The problem with Memorandum 17 is it's impossible to implement, say both contractors and U.S. government officials. The Iraqi government does not yet have the personnel or the capacity to enforce the order. In addition, the scope of the memo's provisions is confusing. "The order applies to security contractors supporting reconstruction-does that include [Agency for International Development] contracts? There are a lot of gray areas," Williams says.

Even if the Iraqi government could implement Memorandum 17, it's not clear how firms ultimately would be held accountable. Many of the security firms operating in Iraq are multinational conglomerates employing foreign nationals, under contract with the U.S. government or other governments as well as private companies and nonprofit organizations. Under Memorandum 17, contractors are subject to the laws of their parent countries, but those laws might not apply to the activities of their citizens abroad, says Deborah Avant, director of the Institute for Global and International Studies at The George Washington University and an expert on the role of private contractors in U.S. interventions abroad.

While the Coalition Provisional Authority tried to specify in some of its orders, including Memorandum 17, the appropriate legal venues for holding contractors accountable, different parts of U.S. law apply to different situations, says Avant, author of the forthcoming book, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge University Press, June 2005). "For instance, the [2001 USA] Patriot Act applies to any crime committed by a U.S. citizen, or against a U.S. citizen anywhere U.S. forces are operating. So some of the foreign nationals working for private security firms in Iraq would be subject to the Patriot Act if they commit a crime against a U.S. citizen," but not if a foreign national commits a crime against an Iraqi, says Avant.

In addition to holding contractors accountable, their rights must be clearly understood as well, especially their right to support from military forces in Iraq. "That's a big issue. The industry is worried about it. Everybody should be worried about it," Avant says.

Since the military force cuts of the early to mid-1990s, the federal government has increasingly turned to contractors to support its foreign policy objectives. That shift in roles and responsibilities has not been accompanied by a change in oversight, says Avant. "Congress has over 200 years established very clear ways in which it is involved in the regulation and structure of military institutions. It's not clear how they're going to be involved in these contracts. The way it's articulated right now, it's very hard for Congress to get information about these companies and to be able to participate in any clear way."

The war in Iraq has created a "target of opportunity for the private sector to provide some capacities that were needed by virtue of not having [more troops or] U.N. peacekeepers there," Avant says. "The U.S. government has not yet configured itself to deal in the kind of security environment we operate in now."

'We're Self-Policing'

Diligence's Williams worries that without effective regulation of security contractors, the actions of some contractors will sully the reputations of legitimate companies providing essential services in Iraq. As the situation stands now, the only real criteria for operating in Iraq is getting there, he says.

"Unfortunately, it's a lure for some cowboy organizations, because the laws are so vague and the money is so huge," Williams says. "For former soldiers in the U.S. and the U.K. who are starting up a company, the atmosphere for starting up in Baghdad is a lot more permissive than starting up anywhere else in the world. You can get yourself a hotel room, a vehicle and some guns and you can start a company."

It is easy to caricature people working in the private security industry as mercenary guns for hire. The industry's excesses can be seen in outsized characters like Spicer and Jonathan "Jack" Idema, the American bounty hunter and former Special Forces soldier convicted in Afghanistan of torturing Afghanis and running his own private jail. Idema apparently convinced some U.S. military personnel that he was a legitimate security operator, working at the behest of the U.S. government. It's not hard to see how that could happen, with hundreds of private security firms working and no easy way to verify their claims.

"The entire industry needs to be regulated," Williams says. "All the aboveboard companies are keen to see the cowboys leave and to see good companies carrying out safe practices. We're all self-policing at the moment."