Getting the Biggest Bang for the Buck

Gansler emphasized getting the right weaponry to meet 21st century defense needs, instead of focusing on the purchasing process. Those weapons weren't necessarily the planes, tanks and ships that formed the core buys of traditional defense budgets. After assessing the likely threat and working with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gansler looked to new technologies to forge a nontraditional beachhead in the procurement process. These technologies included remotely piloted vehicles, anti-missile systems, advanced communications systems and similar programs.

In this shift toward new technology, Gansler sought to shorten the systems development cycle with new acquisition techniques. In particular, he looked to create better ways to balance cost and performance. In the past, building major aircraft systems took 15 years or more. Nowadays, new commercial technology systems or upgrades frequently enter the market at 18-month or even shorter intervals. Historically, as weight and quality increased in aircraft development, costs soared and availability plummeted. In the commercial world, it's customary for quality to go up and costs to go down.

Defense's new evolutionary or so-called "spiral" development process emulates the private sector's strategy in reducing the time it takes to deploy a system. And cost is viewed as an independent variable in the equation. Rather than pushing for state-of-the-art performance, the approach bases system development on future availability of funds. Increments of capability are added over time to match the emerging threat to national security.

Under DoD's revised directives on major weapon and information systems acquisition, released on Oct. 26, systems can be fielded much more quickly by adding performance improvements later. In addition, tests to demonstrate computer compatibility are used to move systems more quickly from a design state into a useful military product. Finally, reliance on competition and commercially available technology keeps costs in check. The evolutionary approach has proved to save time and money for some programs. The Air Force's new remotely piloted vehicle program, for example, progressed from initiation to deployment in just five years. The Joint Strike Fighter program relies on a similar strategy. Competition helps to keep costs down, while performance is balanced against cost in the aircraft's design equation.

However, the approach runs counter to long held beliefs that state-of-the-art technology offers the best discriminator in wartime and that no costs should be spared to maintain that edge. As Gansler says, "people may not want to compromise on performance for earlier availability and proven technology."

Another potential weakness of the new strategy is that it anticipates development as a continuing process that needs to be funded and supported throughout the life of the program. Skeptics wonder whether those resources will be provided or whether tighter budgets will result in inferior systems fielded with no money for subsequent improvements. Only top-level support can ensure this strategy's survival in a culture that prizes peak performance and is skeptical about future budget largesse. It's a path that will require a clear commitment from both the Congress and the new administration.

Another acquisition initiative that will require support from Congress and the administration is loosening restrictions on transferring technology to our allies. To respond to future threats, Defense sees a much greater likelihood of working in a coalition environment, where interoperability among allies is critical. As a result, Defense has been working with the State Department and Congress to relax technology transfer processes. This would allow a freer exchange of high technology goods among coalition members. Not only warfighting but also business strategies fuel this new emphasis. The expanded market should produce not only common systems and support for wartime, but also lower costs as a result of increased competition.

The barrier, however, is a concern that inadequate controls might result in critical technology falling into the wrong hands. Again, only a concerted effort from the new administration can ensure the success of exchanging technology.

Gansler has a piece of advice for incoming political appointees. In spite of the Defense Department's hierarchical organizational structure, "you need to work at consensus building" to achieve such reforms, he says. "You can't get it done on your own in this building."