Carry On?

he 2001 law mandating federal screening of passengers and baggage at the nation's airports was largely a reaction to security companies' failure to detect and deter the Sept. 11 terrorist attackers. Even so, lawmakers did not totally bar private security companies from getting back into the screening business. By November 2004, airports will have to decide whether to stay with federal screeners or return to the private sector for the service. All indications are that the choice won't be easy.

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created a pilot program, backed largely by House Republicans, under which private security companies can perform screening under federal supervision at five selected airports. The law also permits airports to replace screeners provided by the Transportation Security Administration with private screeners beginning Nov. 19.

October's revelation that 20-year-old college student Nathaniel Heatwole of Damascus, Md., smuggled box cutters and simulated explosive materials on board two Southwest Airlines planes increased interest among airport operators in moving back to private screeners. Those favoring such a move contend that airports could set higher standards for screeners, do the job more efficiently and for less money than the federal government, unify security under airport directors, and exercise greater staffing flexibility to meet the changing volume of passengers. Nevertheless, key legislators and other observers insist TSA screeners should continue to do the job.

For its part, TSA recently contracted with BearingPoint, a McLean, Va.-based consulting firm, to come up with a way to evaluate the effectiveness of private screeners working at the five airports in the pilot program and to compare their performance with that of federal screeners. TSA has pledged that the evaluations will be completed in time for airports to make informed decisions next year.

Aviation security has improved in the two years since the Aviation and Transportation Security Act mandated federal screening, according to the General Accounting Office. By the end of December 2002, TSA had hired and deployed a workforce of about 65,000 employees, including passenger and baggage screeners and federal marshals. By then, the agency also was using explosives detection equipment to screen about 90 percent of all checked baggage, GAO found (GAO-03-1150T). But since then, TSA has reduced the number of screeners in response to funding cutbacks.

TSA is working to ensure the "best possible security at all the nation's airports," whether their screeners work for companies or TSA, says TSA spokesman Brian Turmail. He notes that the private screeners go through the same hiring and training process as federal screeners and work under TSA supervision. They receive a minimum of 40 hours of classroom training and 60 hours of on-the-job training. All screeners also are subject to periodic assessments and unannounced performance testing.

But airport operators and others have raised possible problems with TSA's role as regulator and operator of airport screening. The dual role creates potential conflicts of interest, they say, because TSA will be regulating and judging its own performance. "I don't care if you have the best leadership, you need to have checks and balances in the system," says Stephen Van Beek, senior vice president for federal policy for the Airports Council International-North America, which represents 160 U.S. airports.

Van Beek suggests possible changes to the program, such as giving airports the option of doing screening themselves. He also says airports need to know more about liability protection for private firms in the event of another terrorist incident. Before Sept. 11, airports provided screening or hired private security companies, usually with an eye toward keeping costs down.

Robert W. Poole Jr., director of transportation studies at the Los Angeles-based Reason Public Policy Institute, says airport directors want more flexibility than TSA provides to adjust staffing levels to account for changes in airline schedules and slow periods. This might necessitate using part-time workers or moving people to different jobs when passenger flow slows. In addition, many airports would like airport directors to control the workforce, Poole says.

Poole also suggests allowing non-U.S. firms to compete for screening work. Laws that prohibit hiring foreign-owned businesses bar good companies from providing security at U.S. airports, he says. "What sense is it that our European allies cannot compete when they have a lot to offer?"

Poole joins Rep. John Mica, R-Fla., chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Aviation Subcommittee, in favoring the European airport security model, which includes strong central government oversight but leaves baggage and passenger screening to companies that usually are hired by airport directors. Under this model, TSA would conduct oversight; coordinate intelligence, research and development; and establish national standards to ensure uniformity of screening procedures.

Opposition to further privatization of screening is strong within the American Federation of Government Employees. Although screeners are represented by AFGE, they lack collective bargaining rights. The union says that returning screening to private companies could mean a return to security lapses that existed before federal screeners took over. "Airport security should be handled by the federal government, not for profit at the expense of the flying public," says AFGE spokeswoman Diane Witiak. AFGE worries that turning the job over to the private sector also would bring back pre-Sept. 11 problems.

At least two of the firms that screened baggage before the terrorist attack-Argenbright Security Inc. of Atlanta, Ga. and Huntleigh USA Corp of St. Louis, Mo.-are facing lawsuits from the victims' families. But even before Sept. 11, GAO found screeners frequently were unable to detect weapons, explosives and other threatening objects. In addition, auditors reported that inadequate training and supervision, high turnover and low pay contributed to poor performance. The Transportation Department's inspector general also had documented numerous problems with unauthor- ized people gaining access to secure areas.

"We saw where private screeners got us. [Federal] oversight is not enough," says Andrew Davis, spokesman for Sen. Ernest "Fritz" Hollings, D-S.C. Hollings, the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee's top Democrat, remains skeptical of returning to private screeners, Davis says. Hollings sponsored the Senate version of the aviation security bill and led the committee at the time of its passage. The Senate version did not provide for a pilot program for security companies or allow airports to opt out of the federal program.

Rep. James Oberstar, D-Minn., ranking member of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, also strongly supported federalizing the screening force, and that hasn't changed, says the committee's minority spokesman, Jim Berard. "Perhaps there's room for both [federal and private screeners] but Oberstar is not in favor of converting the entire system," Berard says.

The Airports Council's Van Beek says that what's important now isn't who does the screening, but who will regulate screeners and what standards they must meet. Since passage of the aviation security law, screeners are better trained and tested, and evaluation and accountability have improved, he says.

A preliminary GAO report released in September gave TSA screening a mixed review (GAO-03-1173). GAO found TSA provides basic training and has taken steps to provide more comprehensive training of federal screeners, but it needs to develop an ongoing program to ensure all its screeners are effectively trained and supervised. GAO also found that TSA failed to adequately check screeners' ability to detect threatening objects. For its April 2004 final report on all forms of airport screening, GAO is planning to evaluate how well screeners in the pilot program are doing.

Some observers have questioned whether five airports is a large enough sample to judge the success of the program, even though each of the airports represents one of five size categories based on passengers and baggage moved. The companies and airports involved include: McNeil Security Inc. at the Greater Rochester (New York) International Airport, Covenant Aviation Security at San Francisco International and Tupelo (Mississippi) airports; FirstLine Transportation Security at the Kansas City Airport; and the Jackson Hole Airport Board at the Jackson Hole (Wyoming) Airport.

No one knows exactly how many airports will turn to private screeners next year, but Van Beek says as many as 30 of his group's members are interested-15 to 20 small airports and five to 10 large airports. A lot will depend on the level of service TSA will provide now that budget cuts are forcing it to cut screeners, Van Beek says. TSA's workforce has fallen to 48,000, about 5 percent of them part-timers. The agency's funding has been cut from more than $7.1 billion in fiscal 2003 to nearly $4.7 billion for 2004.

TSA is developing processes under which airports can opt out of federal screening and those in the pilot program can return to TSA screeners. TSA, advocacy groups and Congress undoubtedly will scrutinize the evaluations of private screening at the five test airports.

As they decide whether to return to commercial screening, airport operators also will consider those reports, plus the degree of flexibility they are likely to get under federal and private screening programs and the extent of TSA's role in each. In addition, airport managers will have to weigh fliers' willingness to return to private screening barely three years after Sept. 11.