Gathering Intelligence

While a public battle raged in April over who, if anyone, was responsible for failing to prevent the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, a quieter debate was under way over whether, and how, to reorganize the federal bureaucracy for preventing terrorism.

The Sept. 11 commission debates reorganizing intelligence agencies.

The federal commission investigating the attacks will issue its recommendations in late July. Interim reports from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States paint a picture of systemic failures across agencies in the months leading up to Sept. 11.

Not surprisingly, the commission considers breaking down walls between agencies, including domestic and foreign intelligence activities, to be a primary goal.

In the 1970s, revelations that the FBI was collecting intelligence for use against U.S. citizens led to the separation of domestic law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI, from foreign intelligence agencies, such as the CIA. Now current and former officials say those divisions prevented them from connecting domestic dots that could have unraveled the Sept. 11 plot.

Officials disagree, however, on exactly how to reform the federal bureaucracy. In March and April, the commission heard testimony from heavy hitters from the Bush and Clinton administrations. Among the most controversial options are the creation of a new domestic intelligence service and director of national intelligence.

"We have to consider establishing a domestic intelligence organization distinct from law enforcement and subject to appropriate control, regulation and oversight," former Defense Secretary William Cohen told the commission.

Former counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke said that "in a perfect world" the new intelligence service would be separate from the FBI, because he does not believe the bureau's culture and structure could handle such a major overhaul. He proposed starting the new service under the FBI and then making it autonomous as quickly as possible.

Clarke said the government would have to take "extraordinary steps to have active oversight" of the new service. "We'd have to explain to the American people in a very compelling way why they needed a domestic intelligence service, because I think most Americans would be fearful of a secret police in the United States," he added.

Former National Security adviser Samuel Berger said a national intelligence director is needed "with authority to plan, program and budget for intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination." Berger told the Sept. 11 commission that the lack of intelligence coordination, especially within the FBI, is a major problem.

"We've learned since 9/11 that not only did we not know what we didn't know, but the FBI didn't know what it did know," Berger said. He noted that policy coordination for counterterrorism should rest with the National Security adviser.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld argued against the centralization of powers and the appointment of "a single intelligence czar." Instead, he said, "multiple centers of information have proven to be better at promoting creativity and challenging conventional thinking."

Rumsfeld and Berger said the commission should consider something like the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. In response to military deficiencies, including breakdowns during the Iran hostage crisis and the U.S. invasion of Grenada, that law required military services to work together in an unprecedented way. Rumsfeld said the law forced each branch to give up some of its turf and helped move the Defense Department toward a more effective joint approach to warfighting.

"I'm here to tell you, and I'm sure you've heard it before, there is a train coming down the track; there are going to be very real changes made," Commissioner John Lehman told CIA Director George Tenet during a hearing April 14. "Revolution is coming."

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