Bad to Worse

The most detailed investigation to date of abuse of detainees in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison has found the Army's poor management of contract interrogators helped create the environment in which the abuses could occur and continue.

The investigation's final report, prepared by Maj. Gen. George Fay and released in August, chastises Army personnel for not tightly controlling the hired interrogators who were employed by CACI International Inc. of Arlington, Va. Some interrogators were not trained in military interrogation techniques, and some apparently took on supervisory roles, overseeing military personnel and interrogation processes, the investigators found. They recommended that the Army's general counsel consider referring three CACI employees to the Justice Department for prosecution, alleging that the interrogators abused detainees and in some cases refused to follow orders from military personnel.

The report illuminates the circuitous manner in which the contractors were hired (through a contract managed not by the Army, but by the Interior Department) and documents the chaotic atmosphere of Abu Ghraib, where the lines between government and contractor employees were sometimes blurred. In late 2003, Combined Joint Task Force-7, which then commanded coalition forces in Iraq, used Interior's National Business Center, a fee-for-service contracting shop, to hire the CACI interrogators. The Fay investigators were unequivocal in asserting that farming out contract administration was one of many missteps that helped create the environment in which abuses could happen. "Proper oversight did not occur at Abu Ghraib due to a lack of training and inadequate contract management and monitoring," the investigators determined. "This lack of monitoring was a contributing factor to the problems that were experienced with the performance of the contractors."

The investigators found that the contract was handled in an unorthodox fashion from the beginning. A CACI employee helped a military officer write the contract's requirements, potentially a violation of federal acquisition regulations, the investigators found. That employee is the only CACI staffer named in the report-others are simply identified as "civilian," with a numerical designation-and did not work at Abu Ghraib, according to CACI. The officer is identified as a lieutenant colonel, who, investigators reported, was the contracting officer's representative, the official responsible for monitoring contractor performance.

The investigators were critical of the fact that a contracting officer's representative was not even in Iraq. "As learned in the current situation, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to effectively administer a contract when the [contracting officer's representative] is not on-site. . . . An important step in precluding the recurrence of situations where contractor personnel may engage in abuse of prisoners is to ensure that a properly trained COR is on-site."

The Fay team took also issue with the language of the contract. "The technical requirements of the interrogator contract were not adequate," investigators wrote. While the contract requires employees to have qualifications in one of two standard military job descriptions (known as operational specialties) or their equivalent, it does not list specific training requirements. "Any solicitation/contract for these services needs to list specific training . . . not just point to" a job description, investigators found. CACI President and Chief Executive Officer Jack London says his company's employees met all the requirements of the contract.

Soldiers told investigators that some military interrogators "did things by the book," but some CACI interrogators betrayed a "lack of experience." One CACI employee reportedly took offense when a younger military trainer tried to correct his work. According to the report, the employee remarked, "I have been doing this for 20 years and I do not need a 20-year-old telling me how to do my job."

London says the company received more than 1,600 résumés from potential interrogators, and that the crop was winnowed to 48 for the military's approval. The Army inspector general has found that about 35 percent of the contract interrogators lacked formal military training. London acknowledges this, but says they may have received training from other agencies, such as the FBI or the CIA.

Investigators cite "numerous statements" indicating the contractors received "little, if any, training on the Geneva conventions," which govern treatment of detainees in war zones. "It needs to be made clear that contractor employees are bound by the requirements of the Geneva convention," the report says.

Before interrogators went to Iraq, London says, they were briefed by military officials on the rules of interrogation. All the workers were required to have at least a secret-level security clearance, which, London says, ensured that their backgrounds and personal histories had been screened by the government. He says some interrogators received training while working in Abu Ghraib, and some employees hired to screen prisoners as they came into the prison later were made interrogators. Military officials made the decision to convert employees from one job to another, he says. According to London, no more than 10 CACI interrogators worked in Abu Ghraib at one time.

The CACI interrogators arrived at Abu Ghraib to find the interrogation center's commander confused about what to do with them, the Fay investigation found. Capt. Carolyn Wood, the officer in charge of interrogation operations, relied on a CACI "site manager . . . to interview contractors as they arrived and to assign them based on his interviews." Wood "knew little of their individual backgrounds or experience," and said she "never received any parameters or guidance as to how the CACI personnel were to be utilized," according to the report.

In December 2003, Wood took emergency leave. In her absence, a major with the 151st Military Intelligence Battalion was the only commissioned officer in the prison operations section. Investigators concluded that the officer, David Price, "failed to properly train solders and civilians" on interrogation policies and that he "failed to understand the breadth of his responsibilities."

The Army was desperately short-handed at Abu Ghraib, lacking enough military interrogators and police to perform their mission, which is why it hired CACI employees. Investigators' interviews with contractors and soldiers revealed a "lack of understanding of the appropriate relationship between contractor personnel, government civilian employees and military personnel," the report states. "Several people indicated . . . that contractor personnel were 'supervising' government personnel, or vice versa." An army sergeant "indicated that CACI employees were in positions of authority and appeared to be supervising government personnel." One contractor was "listed as being in charge of screening" of detainees on an organization chart, "with military personnel listed as subordinates."

Though some people at Abu Ghraib might have believed that CACI employees were in charge, London says they never acted outside the supervision and command of military officials. Because CACI employees and military personnel worked side by side, CACI employees "could appear to be leading or supervising," he says. The company has conducted an internal investigation of its employees' work. London says he has found no factual basis to support the contention that CACI interrogators were supervising people or processes.

The Fay report also advises that the Army should hire private sector interrogators with caution and only when absolutely necessary. Restricting interrogation work to government employees guarantees that the Army can discipline or criminally prosecute them if necessary, investigators found. Current U.S. law allows Defense Department contractors to be prosecuted for breaking certain U.S. laws while working abroad, but it's likely that law doesn't apply to the CACI employees, who were working under an Interior Department contract.

While the Fay investigators acknowledge the staffing shortages in the prison, they found that "the general policy of not contracting for intelligence functions and services was designed in part to avoid many of the problems that happened at Abu Ghraib. . . . In the performance of such sensitive functions as interrogations, the Army needs to maintain close control over the entire operation."