Sky Cop Scrutiny

The Federal Air Marshal Service has hired and trained thousands of undercover agents to deal with the threat of hijackings and bombings since Sept. 11, 2001. In three years, it has switched parent agencies three times. Now, in the midst of the turmoil-and, apparently, partly because of it-the agency must re-examine the backgrounds of thousands of air marshals because some have been accused of lying on job applications, sleeping on duty, working while drunk or stoned, and losing their weapons.

The accusations came in a report by Clark Kent Ervin, the Homeland Security Department's inspector general, made public in late August. The investigation exposed hundreds of cases of misconduct.

Ervin accused the service of being too lenient with misbehavior and not identifying unsavory pasts. "Many . . . were granted access to classified information after displaying questionable judgment, irresponsibility and emotionally unstable behavior," he wrote.

FAMS says it began reviewing the history of every active marshal before the misdeeds were revealed. "If they do not meet [law enforcement] thresholds, we will take appropriate action-up to and including dismissal," spokesman Dave Adams told Government Executive in September.

Several thousand air marshals-the exact number is undisclosed-were rushed into service after Sept. 11, to prevent hijackings and terrorist incidents on U.S. civilian aircraft. In three years, FAMS has grown from a single office with fewer than three dozen agents into 21 field offices nationwide. It consists of trained, gun-toting law enforcement officers who try to blend in with ordinary passengers on domestic and international flights deemed as high risk. They rely on classified information.

Ervin reported that a review of records turned up 753 cases of misconduct from February to October 2002. The offenses included lost or stolen weapons, sleeping while on duty, testing positive for alcohol or drugs while on duty and falsifying information. In many cases, the offenders were suspended with pay.

Ervin contended they would have been fired for such behavior if they were airport screeners working for the Transportation Security Administration. "Since air marshals are weapon-carrying law enforcement officers, they can and should be held to a standard of conduct at least as high as that of screeners," he wrote.

The report included a rebuttal by DHS Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security Asa Hutchinson, who maintained there were fewer and less serious infractions than Ervin suggested. Citing an audit of the FAMS Operational Integrity Division database, Hutchinson said only 717 infractions were documented in the 22 months from June 2002 to March 2004-and many involved little more than tardiness or complaints of rudeness.

"In cases where termination was appropriate, the FAMS acted swiftly and decisively," Hutchinson wrote, noting that the service terminated 101 agents between March 2002 and March 2004. Ervin stood by his conclusion, pointing out that Hutchinson's numbers came from a source other than the FAMS Human Resources Division.

Ervin also found 104 marshals who chalked up 155 cases of misconduct on their previous jobs at the Bureau of Prisons. The offenses included security breaches, sleeping on duty, verbal and physical abuse, a relationship with an inmate's wife, and misuse of government property and credit cards. The investigation did not stop with active members. Ervin looked at a portion of the 504 applications FAMS reviewed when disciplinary problems arose in 2003. FAMS showed Ervin 161 applicants who were approved for Top Secret clearances despite having financial problems, disciplinary issues and criminal histories.

Ultimately, none of the 161 was hired, according to Adams. It's important to note, he says, that TSA had already cleared them as prospective candidates when FAMS was briefly part of TSA. "We had nothing to do with it," Adams says.

Ervin blamed the missteps on FAMS, TSA and the other DHS agency in which it has been located-the Immigration and Customs Enforcement bureau-along with the Office of Personnel Management. He contends that the agencies did not thoroughly investigate the backgrounds of prospective marshals. He recommends hiring policies be changed to require that all available personnel, security and conduct files be checked.

In his rebuttal, Hutchinson argued that reviewing all information for every applicant would be too expensive. He suggested that FAMS instead rely on references from employers and co-workers to weed out unsuitable applicants before the more expensive clearance investigation begins. But "a current or former supervisor or colleague does not always disclose derogatory information," Ervin said, noting that it happened in only 32 percent of the FAMS cases his office explored.

In addition to condemning policies governing conduct and discipline, Ervin found fault with the training and fitness requirements for federal air marshals. His report points out delays in training, inconsistencies in marksmanship courses and lapses in pistol recertification.

The report also noted problems resulting from the fact that FAMS changed hands three times in three years-first from the Federal Aviation Administration to TSA within the Transportation Department in November 2001, then into Homeland Security under TSA in March 2003, and finally within DHS from TSA to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency. The air marshals joined ICE Nov. 2, 2003, adding about 5,000 ICE special agents to its force. That transfer heightened Ervin's concerns about the problems revealed in his report.