The Dirty Bomb Squad

Since it started keeping records in January 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed at least 597 incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials in 40 countries on six continents. Almost 10 percent-57 reports-were filed in the first six months of 2004. The cases exposed critical security gaps.

Terrorists might try to steal a nuclear weapon, pilfer the necessary components to assemble a crude one of their own, or pocket enough radioactive ingredients to make a dirty bomb. The first line of defense is to prevent theft where the materials are produced and stored. The U.S. programs for doing that in the former Soviet states and at least 11 other countries of concern are "pretty comprehensive," says David Huizenga, Energy Department material protection and coordination administrator. They mix diplomacy, export controls, arms reduction agreements, satellite surveillance and enforcement of safeguards at nuclear facilities. But, Huizenga adds, "Because we don't have complete assurance and because we don't have all material locked down, we want a second line of defense in place to catch everything we might miss."

So, since the Sept. 11 attacks, the United States has stepped up efforts to find and intercept hidden shipments of weapons-usable and radioactive materials at airports, seaports and border crossings overseas. Seven agencies-the Energy, Defense, State and Commerce departments, along with the FBI, the Homeland Security Department's Customs and Border Protection bureau, and Coast Guard-now equip, train and give export control advice and assistance to customs and law enforcement officials in no fewer than 70 countries.

Defense credits that assistance with several seizures between 1999 and 2001. For example, inspectors trained and equipped under a joint Defense-Customs Service project found radioactive containers hidden in an Iranian-licensed waste truck in Uzbeki-stan and aboard a train bound for China in Kazakhstan and a small amount of highly enriched uranium-235 in the trunk of a vehicle in Bulgaria.

Nevertheless, a January 2005 Government Accountability Office report (GAO-05-157) charges, for the sixth time in less than three years, that border security is uncoordinated and disorganized. In light of the complexity of the effort, GAO recommended that Defense and Energy develop an integrated plan for U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction programs and that the National Security Council issue guidance for coordinated border security programs.

State Department

Heads group coordinating U.S. nonproliferation efforts; three programs covering 42 countries:

• Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance-provides legal, licensing, and enforcement training and equipment; funds Energy, Commerce, CBP, FBI and Coast Guard activities; is the only U.S. agency providing assistance in preventing nuclear smuggling in 19 countries.
• Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund-supplements diplomatic efforts, finances rapid-response operations, including forensic and analytical laboratories, radiation equipment and licensing software.
• Border Security and Law Enforcement-focuses entirely on Georgia, provides legal, licensing aid and equipment.

Energy Department

Three programs under the National Nuclear Security Administration:

• International Nonproliferation Export Control-funds improved licensing, compliance and enforcement in 30 countries.
• Second Line of Defense-supplies radiation detection equipment at airports, seaports and border crossings in Greece and Russia.
• Megaports Initiative-provides customs training and radiation detectors for cargo inspections at busy seaports in six countries, supports Container Security Initiative; receives funding from State and Defense.

Defense Department

Four efforts in former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Baltic States.

• Cooperative Threat Reduction-funded equipment, training and export control staffing in five countries from 1993 to 1997.
• Defense/FBI International Counter-proliferation-funds law enforcement equipment and training, ongoing since 1995.
• Defense/Customs International Counterproliferation-supplies border enforcement equipment and training, ongoing since 1997.
• Proliferation Prevention Initiative-enhances detection and interdiction capabilities in Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan-new in 2003; part of CTR and coordinated with Energy.

Homeland Security Department

Customs and Border Protection bureau runs the post-9/11 Container Security Initiative at 34 busy seaports.

• Identifies and prescreens cargo susceptible to terrorism before it reaches the United States.
• Trains and equips host country officials.
• Guides development of secure and "smart" containers that signal when they've been tampered with.
• Operates State Department's Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement Program funded mostly by State and Defense.
• CBP and Coast Guard also have export control advisers in 25 countries.