Bypassing Bureaucracy
Agencies in the Katrina zone threw out the rule book to save lives.
A defining characteristic of Hurricane Katrina was the White House's hand-wringing over negotiating agreements with the state of Louisiana on how the federal government would provide assistance to affected areas. But while talks dragged on at the highest levels, field supervisors for federal agencies in New Orleans didn't wait. They took action with whatever personnel and resources they had.
The Coast Guard didn't need marching orders to start search-and-rescue operations immediately after the storm hit on Aug. 29. Per standard operating procedure, helicopters came in behind the storm and started picking up people from rooftops and other places where they were stranded.
When the levees in New Orleans broke that night and the next day and the city flooded, Coast Guard Capt. Bruce Jones, commanding officer of Air Station New Orleans, knew he was facing an unprecedented disaster. He unleashed every resource at his disposal to save lives, even though he couldn't communicate up his chain of command because phone lines and Internet connections had been knocked out. The station was running on power from generators, which kept failing.
From the first day, the Coast Guard was flying search-and-rescue, or SAR, missions around-the-clock. "We were making things up as we went. The rule book just went out the window," says chief rescue swimmer Mike Thomas.
"It was an incredible display of teamwork and us doing whatever it took to get people out," says Jeff DeMata, chief aviation survival technician.
After seven days, rescue operations from Air Station New Orleans had saved 6,471 people. That's compared with 3,689 rescued in the 50-year existence of the station before the storm. The Coast Guard is calling the experience "the Super Bowl of SAR."
On the ground, agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Homeland Security Department's Customs and Border Protection bureau also were taking initiative to help local law enforcement officers and victims. "We were inventing missions as necessary to save people's lives, save property and take care of our own," says William Renton, DEA's special agent in charge of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Arkansas.
Renton, who grew up in New Orleans and once was a local cop, says his agents contacted their counterparts at the city's police department and learned they needed food, vehicles, weapons and ammunition. He had established a command center at Fountainbleu High School in Mandeville, La., just north of the city. From there, DEA ran supplies to the police and sheriff's offices in surrounding parishes and used its vehicles and boats to transport law enforcement officers and provide protection patrols.
On Sept. 1, DEA learned of a nursing home in the city's 9th Ward that was flooded, but still had not been evacuated. Renton says he sent helicopters and boats there and found people without food, water and all but a few remaining medical supplies. The next morning, he says, his agents commandeered three National Guard trucks and rescued 70 people at the home. From that day forward, DEA helped rescue more than 3,300 people, Renton says.
CBP also used its boats and helicopters to support law enforcement and help victims, without waiting for orders, says William Heffelfinger, the agency's deputy assistant commissioner for field operations. Heffelfinger commanded all CBP operations in the affected region.
The agency set up a command post at the New Orleans Air and Marine Operations branch in Hammond, La., north of the city. From there, the agency flew Blackhawk helicopters in support of law enforcement, delivered water and MREs to victims, scrambled P-3 aircraft to establish emergency communications between agencies, and contacted sheriffs in nearby parishes to provide help, Heffelfinger says.
The Border Patrol conducted the largest tactical operation in its history on Sept. 5, deploying five Blackhawks, 87 elite agents and 20 vehicles into the city's 2nd and 9th wards to secure a perimeter for 24 hours, all without rehearsal.
"Some of the initiative that the guys showed down here has been amazing," Heffelfinger says. "This is the most rewarding mission I've had in 37 years in government, by far. . . . Whatever needed to get done, we got done."
Officials from the three agencies expressed frustration over the Federal Emergency Management Agency's slow response to the crisis. Coast Guard personnel, for example, say all they could do was pick up people who were in immediate danger and drop them in a dry, safe area. From there it seemed only logical that FEMA or another agency would pick up the people and take them to shelters. But that wasn't happening.
Renton and Heffelfinger say they were not directed by FEMA to do missions in the days after the hurricane, even though they had resources and personnel. "There was no clear direction," Renton says. "By definition, somebody from FEMA should have been telling us what we needed to do."
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