Three years after anthrax, postal response system very different

The Postal Service can learn two lessons from the October 2001 anthrax attacks, according to a new Government Accountability Office report. The agency should "err on the side of caution" whenever employee safety is in question, and it should act fast to share as much information with workers and the public as possible.

The report (GAO-04-239) describes the chaos and confusion of the weeks almost three years ago during which 22 cases of anthrax were discovered. Though postal officials knew that contaminated letters had passed through the mail system, public health officials advised that because the letters remained sealed until they were delivered, postal employees faced little risk. They realized too late that the anthrax particles were smaller than the envelopes' pores and could therefore seep out.

The letters caused three cases of cutaneous anthrax and six cases of inhalation anthrax when they passed through postal facilities in New Jersey and Washington, D.C. Two postal workers, Joseph Curseen Jr. and Thomas Morris Jr., died. Both worked at the Brentwood mail processing facility in Washington, which has since been renamed in their honor.

Postal officials made employee safety the top priority when deciding whether or not to close facilities, the report said, but health officials relied on limited and sometimes inaccurate information about anthrax when advising the Postal Service.

Some postal employees believed their safety was considered less important than that of workers in congressional offices, which were closed immediately upon the discovery of contaminated letters. The report concludes that officials from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Postal Service would have closed facilities sooner had they known the envelopes could leak enough spores to harm workers.

The Postal Service no longer relies as heavily on direction from other agencies. When the poison ricin was discovered in the Senate mailroom last February, for example, the Postal Service closed one of its facilities, monitored workers' health and conducted environmental tests. The Postal Service now irradiates mail headed for federal agencies and has begun testing biohazard detectors in 15 facilities.

The Postal Inspection Service has developed an intensive program to train 200 inspectors in biohazard detection, forensic sampling, hazardous material crime-scene processing, and the isolation, control and tracking of mail. "We're taking a very aggressive approach," says Zane Hill, the postal inspector in charge of dangerous mail and homeland security.

GAO said the Postal Service should improve communications between agencies and with the public. The agency did not quickly release anthrax spore counts for one of its facilities after a labor union leader requested them, even though the Occupational Safety and Health Administration requires the disclosure of such information.

Communication with the public following the anthrax discovery was unclear and understated the risks to postal workers, the report said, but these problems arose primarily from the limited scientific knowledge of anthrax. The report advised the Postal Service to be more forthcoming and to acknowledge what it does not know.

The report noted that an October 2003 newsletter sent to former Brentwood workers stated the facility was "100 percent free of anthrax contamination" and returning to work there involved "no remaining health risk." But there is no scientific proof for such definitive claims. The Postal Service acknowledged the mistake, and has taken steps to improve emergency communications.