Watchdog Vindicates Whistleblowers Who Warned Navy Yard Was Not Secure

The White House and Congress on Tuesday received confirmation that two whistleblowers working at the Washington Navy Yard before the deadly shootings in September 2013 had warned of weaknesses in the facility’s security procedures but weren’t taken seriously.

The Office of Special Counsel, which released the declassified and redacted report from the Navy inspector general, had been approached by former Navy Strategic Systems Program managers Sparky Edwards and Vernon Londagin, who said their internal complaints were not acted on seriously.

In an investigation ordered by the Office of Special Counsel and completed in May 2014, the IG substantiated seven of eight allegations of information security vulnerabilities at Building 200, where the Strategic Systems Program handles highly classified information on the Navy’s Fleet Ballistic Missile Strategic Weapons System. The shootings took place in Building 197.

The allegations included charges that “the procedures for entry to the Washington Navy Yard permitted access to people who were not properly screened,” a finding also made by the Navy’s own earlier investigation. Further, the controlled access areas and open storage secret areas “did not meet physical and information security requirements and were improperly certified,” the IG report said. Employees improperly stored and used cellphones in the controlled areas and allowed safes designed for storing classified material to go uninspected and without updated combination locks. In addition, “employees left common access cards unattended in workstations, and, in at least one instance, positioned a computer screen displaying classified information toward an uncovered window.”

The Navy unit’s security director, investigators determined, “did not meet his responsibility to ensure that all physical and information security standards were met.” No evidence was found that classified material was compromised.

Perhaps most relevant to the tragedy in which contractor Aaron Alexis gained access to the facility and murdered a dozen of his co-workers was the looseness of security procedures governing who enters the campus at large — procedures put in place by departmental directives years ago.

Before blowing the whistle, Edwards conducted tests of the procedures. Because the Washington Navy Yard “perimeter was not secure and the entry doors to Building 200 were open and unguarded 24/7, this would allow a would-be intruder to approach SSP HQ on the 3rd, 4th and 5th floors,” the report said. “This was Mr. Edwards’ concern prompting him to conduct a test of the glass and wooden framed door to [the controlled access area], demonstrating that the glass could be forced from the wooden frame with quick, concentrated physical effort.”

A mitigating factor, the report noted, is that “security-in-depth” is not required for controlled access areas, especially if there are security offsets through systems such as alarms, intrusion detection sensors and cameras.

The whistleblower also found laxness by the civilian security guards checking identification documents of those entering the property. The report said Edwards testified that his car did not have a Naval District Washington decal, saying “at that time, decals were required or you’re supposed to go to the visitor gate. Anybody was getting on with a driver’s license.”

Londagin added, “Yeah, the military personnel were pretty spot on when it came to the decal thing and checking the CAC cards or whatever. The security guards that aren’t military, they don’t care.”

The only allegation not substantiated was the charge that the security director concealed noncompliant procedures from Fleet Operations Command inspectors.

A follow-up examination by the vice chief of Naval Operations in 2015 led to administrative counseling of the Strategic Systems Program director. Since then, the IG has confirmed that all security deficiencies identified have been corrected.

Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner said in a statement: “I want to thank Mr. Edwards and Mr. Londagin, whose disclosures have improved the security of our nation’s classified information.”