Republican candidates Ted Cruz (left) and John Kasich have an exchange during the March 10 debate.

Republican candidates Ted Cruz (left) and John Kasich have an exchange during the March 10 debate. Wilfredo Lee/AP

Cruz and Kasich Are Playing Right Into Trump's Hands

Instead of strategizing to stop Trump, his rivals are still acting like he isn’t the front-runner in the race.

Even as Don­ald Trump’s strong per­form­ance Tues­day night was a ser­i­ous set­back to the anti-Trump move­ment, the biggest obstacles to stop­ping Trump are his own Re­pub­lic­an rivals. In­stead of work­ing to­geth­er and deny­ing Trump del­eg­ates, both Ted Cruz and John Kasich have pur­sued self-de­struct­ive, self-in­ter­ested strategies that seemed de­signed more to one-up each oth­er than take on the front-run­ner in the race.

Ac­cord­ing to The Cook Polit­ic­al Re­port’s del­eg­ate score­card, des­pite Trump’s suc­cess­ful night last Tues­day, he is now (slightly) off track to se­cur­ing the 1,237 del­eg­ates ne­ces­sary to clinch be­fore the con­ven­tion. And, ac­cord­ing to the del­eg­ate math, Cruz and Kasich have no path to win­ning a ma­jor­ity. If both Cruz and Kasich are look­ing to deny Trump his ne­ces­sary del­eg­ates (and press their luck with a con­tested con­ven­tion), they should be co­ordin­at­ing to their ad­vant­age. Kasich would cede most of the West­ern states, with more-con­ser­vat­ive elect­or­ates, to Cruz. Cruz, whose so­cial con­ser­vat­ism doesn’t sell well above the Ma­son-Dix­on line, would al­low Kasich free rein in the North­east battle­grounds.

In­stead, we’re see­ing Trump’s op­pon­ents em­ploy strategies that mainly help Trump. Cruz spent valu­able time in the cam­paign’s last week in Flor­ida and Ohio, seek­ing to deny Marco Ru­bio and Kasich vic­tor­ies in their home states. (It had no im­pact: Kasich won com­fort­ably; Ru­bio lost badly.) That time would have been much bet­ter spent in Mis­souri, where Cruz lost by less than 2,000 votes, or in Illinois, where Cruz could have se­cured more del­eg­ates with a stronger show­ing.

Mean­while, Kasich is spend­ing valu­able time and cam­paign cash on ads in Utah, a state where Cruz is well-po­si­tioned to win big on Tues­day. But while Cruz would win all the state’s del­eg­ates with an out­right ma­jor­ity, fall­ing short of the 50 per­cent mark means Trump takes home 20 ad­di­tion­al del­eg­ates. Kasich’s re­sources would be much bet­ter util­ized in pre­par­ing for the round of North­east­ern primar­ies on April 26, when Pennsylvania, Con­necti­c­ut, Delaware, Mary­land, and Rhode Is­land Re­pub­lic­ans head to the polls. Kasich is well po­si­tioned to con­sol­id­ate sup­port with the re­gion’s many sub­urb­an­ites, and he has spe­cif­ic ap­peal in the Pitt­s­burgh area; he grew up in McK­ees Rocks, Pennsylvania (the son of a mail­man, as his stump speech goes).

But in­stead of think­ing stra­tegic­ally, Kasich and Cruz are be­hav­ing as if they have a lo­gic­al shot at win­ning a ma­jor­ity of del­eg­ates. Cruz na­ively be­lieves that, if the race were a one-on-one battle with him and Trump, he’d pre­vail. These as­sump­tions are de­lu­sion­al. Cruz would likely lose badly to Trump head-to-head in the North­east­ern battle­grounds, where his brand of con­ser­vat­ism is as dis­liked as Trump’s pop­u­list spiel. And Kasich is math­em­at­ic­ally elim­in­ated from win­ning a ma­jor­ity of del­eg­ates; it’s near-im­possible for him to even come close to Trump.

Their path to vic­tory lies in deny­ing Trump enough del­eg­ates to have a ma­jor­ity en­ter­ing the con­ven­tion. The math shows such an out­come is very pos­sible. The ques­tion is wheth­er Trump’s rivals have the stra­tegic dis­cip­line to pull of the task.

TRAIL MIX

1) The biggest fear among Re­pub­lic­an op­er­at­ives is that, if Trump wins the GOP nom­in­a­tion, around one-quarter of GOP voters will stay home and not cast bal­lots for down­bal­lot Re­pub­lic­an can­did­ates—a sig­ni­fic­antly great­er num­ber than those who would be drawn to the polls by Trump’s can­did­acy. It’s a much big­ger con­cern than the pro­spect that a lop­sided Hil­lary Clin­ton vic­tory over Trump would carry down­bal­lot Demo­crat­ic coat­tails. If close to one-quarter of rank-and-file Re­pub­lic­ans don’t even show up to vote, not only is con­trol of the Sen­ate en­dangered, but fairly safe GOP-held seats in Mis­souri, In­di­ana, and Ari­zona could sud­denly come in­to play. And con­trol of the House, which un­til re­cently looked ger­ry­mandered bey­ond Demo­crat­ic con­trol, would also be in play. Demo­crats would need to net 30 House seats to win back a ma­jor­ity. That’s ex­actly how many seats the party won in the 2006 wave, one that many Re­pub­lic­ans didn’t see com­ing un­til it was too late to do any­thing.

That’s pre­cisely why some party lead­ers be­lieve hav­ing a third-party con­ser­vat­ive can­did­ate is something of a ne­ces­sity with Trump as the nom­in­ee. Even if a split Re­pub­lic­an Party costs them the pres­id­ency, get­ting enough GOP voters to the polls will be cru­cial with the Sen­ate and the House both po­ten­tially in play.

2) For a third-party con­ser­vat­ive can­did­ate to have any chance of suc­cess bey­ond be­ing a spoil­er, he/she needs to bring three skills to the table: a) high name iden­ti­fic­a­tion, since such a can­did­ate can’t spend valu­able time get­ting voters to know him or her; b) per­son­al wealth and/or ac­cess to top donors; and c) abil­ity to straddle the ideo­lo­gic­ally wide di­vide of Trump crit­ics, from the es­tab­lish­ment cen­ter to grass­roots con­ser­vat­ives con­vinced Trump is a fraud. That’s hard for nearly any­one to ac­com­plish un­der nor­mal cir­cum­stances.

Many names have been floated, in­clud­ing Mitt Rom­ney, former Texas Gov. Rick Perry and former Ok­lahoma Sen. Tom Coburn — all of whom have flaws as a third-party al­tern­at­ive. (Rom­ney’s too es­tab­lish­ment, Perry is too con­ser­vat­ive, and Coburn is too un­known.) But the Re­pub­lic­an who best fits the bill is House Speak­er Paul Ry­an. This week, Ry­an furi­ously denied any in­terest in pur­su­ing a can­did­acy at the con­ven­tion. But he had been equally adam­ant that he would nev­er run for speak­er. If Re­pub­lic­ans get to the un­likely point where none of the ac­tu­al can­did­ates could muster a ma­jor­ity, Ry­an would be the only con­tender who’d have a shot at bridging the di­vide.

3) Wis­con­sin Gov. Scott Walk­er will be the most in­ter­est­ing politi­cian to watch in the next few weeks, in the run-up to his state’s crit­ic­al April 5 primary. He’s one of the few Re­pub­lic­ans not to be dam­aged in the Trump tor­nado, since he dropped out of the race early and pres­ci­ently warned that oth­ers should fol­low his lead to stop Trump. Walk­er has a chance to demon­strate his clout by ral­ly­ing his state’s voters against Trump and en­dors­ing a favored chal­lenger.   If he de­cides to en­dorse, Walk­er’s di­lemma will be the same as oth­er anti-Trump Re­pub­lic­ans — de­cid­ing which al­tern­at­ive to rally be­hind. While Cruz looks like the strongest anti-Trump chal­lenger na­tion­ally, he has lim­ited ap­peal in Wis­con­sin, where only 37 per­cent of GOP voters are evan­gel­ic­al and few­er than one-third define them­selves as very con­ser­vat­ive.  Kasich could well be the more nat­ur­al al­tern­at­ive to anti-Trump Re­pub­lic­ans.  

And if Walk­er wants to run for pres­id­ent again in 2020, ali­en­at­ing Trump’s sup­port­ers would cause him prob­lems down the road.  Walk­er is one of the shrink­ing num­ber of Re­pub­lic­ans with ap­peal among the es­tab­lish­ment and blue-col­lar pop­u­lists. That didn’t do him any good in a race that Trump took over from the be­gin­ning. Wheth­er he spends his re­main­ing polit­ic­al cap­it­al to stop Trump in his home state or saves it for the fu­ture will go a long way in show­ing where the nom­in­a­tion is headed.