Senate report details widespread Secret Service failures in Trump assassination attempt
Lack of communication and leadership led to USSS errors, though the agency maintains no individual employees were to blame.
Finger pointing and confusion over responsibilities mired the U.S. Secret Service’s preparations for former President Donald Trump’s July rally that led to an assassination attempt, according to a new, bipartisan congressional report, though the agency admitted its failures allowed the deadly incident to unfold.
USSS personnel declined to identify any individuals within their agency who shouldered the blame, telling the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee staff who compiled the interim report all key decisions were made together by various groups of people. They noted their communication was poor, while the committee flagged inadequate communication among federal, state and local law enforcement and failures to ensure proper teams and equipment were in place prior to Trump’s speech.
Secret Service acting Director Ronald Rowe—who took over for Kimberly Cheatle after the then-director resigned following the incident—previously told Congress his agency has already implemented reforms to address its shortcomings during the July Trump rally, but the committee put forward a series of additional changes USSS should implement. Those included legislation to require more defined roles for Secret Service personnel, better coordination with state and local partners and the designation of a single individual to approve all operational plans prior to a protection event.
At the rally in Butler, Pa., during which Thomas Crooks fired eight shots from a nearby roof that killed one rally attendee and injured three people, including Trump, there was no such individual who approved the plans. USSS sent seven advance agents to the farm in Butler and in the week leading up to the rally they had meetings and a walk through with state and local personnel. The various law enforcement groups did not share documents or written operational plans in the days prior to the event.
“I don’t approve anything,” USSS’ senior advance agent told the committee, explaining he simply synthesized information and passed it along.
He went on to say no one person in particular was responsible for securing the American Glass Research roof from which Crooks shot.
“There’s no specific,” the agent said. “There were several different plans in place, different pieces of the puzzle from the advance that all had their own stake in making sure that that building was not accessible.”
Anthony Guglielmi, a USSS spokesman, said the agency has reviewed the report, which aligned with its own findings and is "essential to ensuring that what happened on July 13 never happens again."
"The U.S. Secret Service has implemented changes to our protective operations, including elevating the protective posture for our protectees and bolstering our protective details as appropriate in order to ensure the highest levels of safety and security for those we protect," Guglielmi said, adding Trump is currently receiving the "highest level of protection" the agency can provide.
Local Butler police said they warned USSS they did not have the manpower to secure the AGR building during a meeting leading up to Trump’s rally, though USSS officials recalled the meeting differently.
Ultimately, Pennsylvania State Police provided 30 officers to USSS, more than the 10-15 it originally estimated it could make available. Butler County sent three sniper teams and approximately 20-25 officers. Secret Service denied a request to have counter unmanned aircraft systems capabilities on sight. The advance team never requested a separate unit to patrol the outer perimeter of the event space.
Local law enforcement first observed an individual with a rangefinder and notified USSS personnel 27 minutes before Crooks took his first shot. Eight Secret Service officials were aware of the sighting seven minutes later. They were aware someone was on the roof two minutes before the shooting, and an agency counter sniper saw local law enforcement rushing toward the area with their guns drawn just before Crooks fired. That individual said it did not occur to him to alert Trump’s detail on the ground of what he saw. Local police were searching for a specific individual with a rangefinder but lost track of him prior to the shooting, which the Secret Service did not learn of until after Crooks fired on Trump.
Secret Service and Butler police maintained two separate communications centers and they spoke on two separate radio channels. To speak to each other, they had to use cell phones. The committee found USSS and local law enforcement did not communicate in real time.
“Clearly, there were communication gaps that day that led to this failure,” assistant director of the USSS Office of Protective Operations told the committee. “And if those communication gaps had been mitigated, information could have been passed in a more timely fashion that would’ve avoided that failure.”
Guglielmi said USSS is working to address those gaps.
"We are also diligently examining long-term solutions to challenges such as enhancing communications and interoperability with our federal, state and local partners to make sure our coordinated efforts during protective events are seamless," he said.
USSS staff and local law enforcement pointed the finger at each other over who was responsible for securing the AGR building from which Crooks shot. Local sniper teams said they were instructed to focus primarily on threats from the crowd rather than the surrounding areas.
Secret Service does not typically send counter snipers to events with former presidents or presidential candidates before they have officially become a major party nominee—as was the case with Trump at that time—but opted to do so for the Butler rally because of a “credible threat” against Trump. That threat was not related to Crooks specifically. The senior agent in charge of the Pittsburgh Field Office told the committee he was not aware of the threat and would have assigned additional personnel if he had been.
The Senate committee called on USSS to improve its coordination with state and local personnel, including by reviewing all operational plans and ensure a shared understanding of responsibilities. All parties should have smooth communications, the panel said, and allocation of resources should be based on threat level rather than the title of the protectee.
Earlier this month, a second would-be assassin was located by Secret Service on a golf course where Trump was playing. Prosecutors are seeking to charge Ryan Routh, the alleged gunman, of an assassination attempt on a presidential candidate.
While Secret Service has not cited insufficient resources as a cause for its failures, a top official recently said it has “long been the case” his agency is stretched too thin. The stopgap funding bill set to reach Biden’s desk this week would provide USSS with a $231 million funding surge through Dec. 20. The committee called on Congress to "evaluate USSS budget and resources" going forward.