Contrasting rescue missions show effects of networked military communications

Two occasions when Army helicopters were downed by enemy fire, two rescue missions launched to pluck the survivors from swarming guerrilla fighters, two very different outcomes.

In one, the well-known "Black Hawk Down" battle in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, 18 Americans were killed and dozens wounded, leading to the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country. In the other, a lesser-known battle near Tal Afar, Iraq, in 2004, a helicopter crew was successfully rescued and no American troops were killed.

The difference, according to a new study by the RAND Corp.: The forces in 2004 had networked digital communications networks and access to high-capacity satellite communications and navigation that troops in Mogadishu lacked.

The digitally networked troops at Tal Afar were able to organize the rescue much faster, react to fast-changing battlefield events more quickly and find their way through congested city streets while under heavy enemy fire. The findings are in a new report, "Networked Forces in Stability Operations," that examines whether networking technologies translate into improved battlefield performance.

In the Mogadishu battle, ground units in Humvees that were sent to rescue a helicopter shot down by a rocket-propelled grenade did not have Global Positioning System receivers and had to rely on paper maps for navigation. Commanders in helicopters tried to guide rescuers to the crash site, but the ground troops, under attack by thousands of Somali gunmen, got lost in a maze of streets and alleys. Also, helicopter gunships were reluctant to provide close-in fire support because they were uncertain of the exact location of friendly troops.

Communication was limited to voice-only analog radios. Two problems resulted. First, troops used various frequencies, so different groups sent to the crash site couldn't talk to each other. Second, the few frequencies used by multiple groups quickly were jammed because so many troops were trying to talk at the same time.

The 15-hour battle dissolved into individual firefights between American troops and swarms of Somali gunmen, with little or no coordination between friendly units. The long delays caused by poor communications and units getting lost gave enemy forces more time to gather strength.

The outcome at Tal Afar a decade later stands in sharp contrast. The Army units in that battle were equipped with Stryker wheeled vehicles and had several significant, technological advantages. Foremost was Blue Force Tracker, a system that used GPS to track the location of every American vehicle. These were overlaid on a map, and displayed on a computer screen as blue icons. BFT also allows instant text messaging between networked units. The Stryker unit also had high-bandwidth satellite voice communications.

The Tal Afar battle began when a Kiowa Warrior helicopter providing surveillance for ground troops was shot down by a rocket-propelled grenade fired by an insurgent. The Stryker unit commander could see the helicopter icon on his BFT. He immediately dispatched a rescue team in Stryker vehicles that reached the injured pilots within five minutes.

A video surveillance feed from an aerial drone showed a large group of insurgents moving toward the crash site that threatened to overrun the small rescue force. Watching the battle on his computer screen, the Stryker unit commander dispatched reinforcements to the beleaguered rescuers. Even though they were forced to maneuver down small roads and alleyways, and were under heavy enemy fire nearly the entire time, the reinforcing column never got lost and arrived at the site within 30 minutes to establish a defensive perimeter.

Knowing exactly where friendly units were located, the commander was able to call in accurate air support from combat jets and helicopters, even though enemy fighters were located dangerously close to friendly troops. The helicopter wreckage was recovered, insurgent attackers were driven off and the Strykers returned to their base. The entire operation lasted less than three hours.

RAND's analysts concluded that digital networking and satellite voice communication contributed directly to the successful outcome of the Tal Afar battle, particularly in speed of battle command, capacity to synchronize the movement of multiple units and ability to talk to aircraft overhead.

The Stryker unit did have the advantage of armored vehicles, while the American troops in Mogadishu were mostly in unarmored trucks. The American troops at Tal Afar also faced a smaller enemy force than those in Mogadishu, though the analysts note the slow response time of American troops in Mogadishu allowed more enemy forces to gather.

The RAND report pointed out that the BFT remains a "blue force" digital network, in that it provides the exact location of friendly troops but not that of enemy or "red forces." In Iraq, establishing their location remains largely dependent on human intelligence.